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INTRODUCTION 
A “reverse-Erie”1 problem arises when a state court is hearing a federal 
cause of action2 and confronts a situation in which a state law and a federal 
law con+ict. The term ,nds its etymological origin in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins, which dealt with the opposite problem of a federal court sitting in 
diversity confronting a situation where a state law and a federal law conflict.3 
As Professor Kevin Clermont noted in one of the only in-depth scholarly 
papers exclusively on reverse-Erie, the topic is “strangely ignored by most 
scholars” and often “misunderstood, mischaracterized, and misapplied by 
judges and commentators.”4  
Although reverse-Erie problems are regularly dealt with at the state 
court level,5 they are rarely dealt with at the federal level. Since a reverse-Erie 
 
1 Some commentators alternatively use the term “converse-Erie,” Joseph R. Oliveri, Converse-
Erie: The Key to Federalism in an Increasingly Administrative State, %# GEO. WASH. L. REV. !)%" 
("''&), or “inverse-Erie,” Gregory Gelfand & Howard B. Abrams, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 
(* U. PITT. L. REV. *)%, *(! n.!' (!*&&). For consistency, this Comment refers to the concept as 
“reverse-Erie.” 
2 See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, !)" S. Ct. %(', %(& ("'!") (noting that concurrent 
state court jurisdiction over federal causes of action is a presumption rebuttable only by express 
congressional intent for exclusive federal court jurisdiction); Testa v. Katt, ))' U.S. )&#, )*( 
(!*(%) (holding that state courts of competent jurisdiction may not refuse to hear federal causes of 
action). 
3 )'& U.S. #( (!*)&). 
4 Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, &" NOTRE DAME L. REV. !, " ("''#). 
5 See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie 
Doctrine, !"' YALE L.J. !&*&, !*#' ("'!!) (“[S]imply by virtue of their numbers, state courts hear 
more federal-question cases than do federal courts, and so these state cases have a signi,cant e-ect 
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problem, by de,nition, can arise only in state court, the only federal court 
that can consider a reverse-Erie problem is the U.S. Supreme Court on a 
writ of certiorari from a state court of last resort6—an infrequent occur-
rence.7 Indeed, commentators consider only four reverse-Erie cases to be 
seminal8 in the development of the current doctrine.  
Given that these four cases were decided decades apart from each other 
and do not use a consistent methodology,9 state courts facing reverse-Erie 
problems are left to resolve the Supreme Court’s ambiguity in this area. 
The result has been virtual chaos, with state courts approaching reverse-Erie 
problems with di-erent methodologies that lead to divergent results.10 This 
Comment attempts to develop an analytically cogent framework for the 
treatment of reverse-Erie problems. 
At the outset, it is important to note that a reverse-Erie problem can 
occur when (!) a federal constitutional provision con+icts with a state law; 
(") an express federal statutory provision con+icts with a state law; ()) 
federal common law fashioned or endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court 
con+icts with a state law; (() federal common law fashioned or endorsed by 
an inferior federal court con+icts with a state law; or ($) a state law con+icts 
with the interests inherent in a federal statute (i.e., the creation of federal 
common law may be justi,ed where it does not already exist).11  
In the ,rst three categories, a state court operating under the command 
of the Supremacy Clause is bound to follow the federal rule as long as it is 
pertinent and valid.12 Thus, this Comment focuses on categories four and 
 
on the meaning of federal law.”); infra notes "(#-(* (providing a range of cases where state courts 
faced reverse-Erie problems). 
6 See "& U.S.C. § !"$%(a) ("'!") (allowing the U.S. Supreme Court to hear appeals from 
decisions of “the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had” implicating federal law). 
7 See Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, $) 
WM. & MARY L. REV. !"!*, !"#* ("'!") (noting that, between the Court’s !**) and "''& terms, 
appeals from a state supreme court constituted only thirteen percent of the Court’s docket). 
8 See Clermont, supra note (, at ") (identifying these seminal decisions as Brown v. Western 
Railway of Alabama, ))& U.S. "*( (!*(*); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co., )(" 
U.S. )$* (!*$"); Felder v. Casey, (&% U.S. !)! (!*&&); and Johnson v. Fankell, $"' U.S. *!! (!**%)). 
9 See infra note "((. 
10 See infra notes "(#-(& and accompanying text. 
11 But see Clermont, supra note (, at "' (de,ning reverse-Erie more narrowly to include only 
the ,rst three categories that this Comment identi,es). 
12 See U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”); Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., $!$ S.E."d #%$, #&* (N.C. !***) 
(“[F]ederal common law rules . . . are binding on the states through the supremacy clause.”); 
Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, ** HARV. L. REV. &&!, &*% & 
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,ve, where pertinent federal common law created or endorsed by an inferior 
federal court exists or where pertinent federal common law has yet to be 
created by any federal court. 
The goal of this Comment is to examine the limitations on the federal 
courts in creating federal common law and to apply these limitations in 
developing a uni,ed theory for treating reverse-Erie problems. This Com-
ment develops an analytical framework for state court judges to use when 
facing a situation where a state rule con+icts with federal common law 
fashioned by an inferior federal court or with federal statutory interests that 
may justify the creation of federal common law.  
Part I recounts the facts and legal holdings of the Court’s four seminal 
reverse-Erie cases. These cases are used for illustrative purposes throughout 
the Comment. Part II demonstrates that the Supreme Court is creating 
common law, rather than engaging in statutory interpretation, in its reverse-
Erie cases. Thus, the Supreme Court’s four seminal reverse-Erie cases fall 
within the ,fth category of reverse-Erie identi,ed above.  
Part III introduces the Rules of Decision Act (RDA)13 as the main limi-
tation on the power of the Court to create federal common law. Part III 
demonstrates that, once the RDA is seen as a limitation on the Court’s 
power to create common law, the notion that the Court is “preempting” 
state law in its reverse-Erie cases is misleading. 
Additionally, given that the Court is fashioning common law in its reverse-
Erie cases, Part III provides an in-depth examination of the nature of the 
RDA limitation on the power of the Court to create federal common law.14 
The primary question when the Court is deciding whether it should fashion 
federal common law under an RDA approach is: Has Congress required in 
its statute that the Court create a uniform judge-made rule? To this end, 
Part III examines the Court’s federal common law jurisprudence with the 
goal of illuminating when the Court is more or less likely to determine that 
a federal statute has required the creation of a uniform judge-made rule.  
 
n.#( (!*&#) (citing U.S. Supreme Court cases that hold federal common law to be binding on state 
court judges). 
13 See "& U.S.C. § !#$" ("'!") (“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution 
or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded 
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”).  
14 A discussion of the power of federal courts to create common law is beyond the scope of 
this Comment. This Comment assumes that federal courts have the power to create common law 
under a delegated theory of federal common law making power and discusses only the limits on 
that power. For a discussion of the delegated theory of federal common law making power, see 
generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, !$) U. PA. L. 
REV. &"$, &#"-%% ("''$). 
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The Comment then evaluates the Court’s four seminal reverse-Erie cases 
against this RDA theory of federal common law making to determine how 
faithful the Court has been to this statutory limit on its power. Part III 
concludes that the Court has been inconsistent in its reverse-Erie cases with 
the methodology it has used in determining that a federal statute has or has 
not required that the Court fashion federal common law.  
With the limits on the power of federal courts to create common law 
explored, Part IV develops an analytical framework for state court judges to 
use when facing a reverse-Erie problem in categories four and ,ve. This 
analytical framework is based on the idea that a state court facing a problem 
of federal law must decide the issue as it believes the U.S. Supreme Court, 
which is bound by the RDA, would decide the issue. 
Part IV begins by addressing the fourth category of reverse-Erie (perti-
nent federal common law created by inferior federal courts). The Comment 
argues that state court judges should give federal common law created by 
federal courts of appeals a presumption of correctness. That is to say, a state 
court should presume that the federal court of appeals acted within its RDA 
limit as outlined in Part III of this Comment. However, where the state 
court ,nds that the federal court of appeals’ creation of the common law 
was clearly erroneous (i.e., the federal court of appeals clearly erred by not 
adhering to the RDA limit on its power), the state court should not be 
required to follow the common law.  
As to the ,fth category of reverse-Erie (yet uncreated federal common 
law), Part IV links the inconsistency of the Supreme Court in dealing with 
its reverse-Erie cases to the inconsistency of the state courts in dealing with 
such cases. Part IV applies the RDA limit developed in Part III to propose 
an analytical framework for state courts to use when facing a situation 
where the interests inherent in a federal statute may justify the creation of 
federal common law where it does not already exist. Finally, the Comment 
selects a variety of state court cases dealing with reverse-Erie problems in 
this ,fth category and evaluates them against the proposed analytical 
framework. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S FOUR SEMINAL  
REVERSE-ERIE CASES 
The ,rst step in developing a uni,ed theory of reverse-Erie is to review 
the Court’s four seminal reverse-Erie cases—Brown,15 Dice,16 Felder,17 and 
Johnson.18 
 
15 Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., ))& U.S. "*( (!*(*). 
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A. Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama 
The Supreme Court laid the foundation for modern reverse-Erie doc-
trine in Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama.19 Brown was an employee of 
the Western Railway of Alabama.20 He ,led a Federal Employers Liability 
Act (FELA) claim21 in Georgia state court against his employer after he was 
injured at work.22 He alleged that the Railway had negligently allowed 
clinkers23 to accumulate along the side of the railway tracks, which had 
injured him after he stepped on them while performing his job.24   
At the time of his suit, Georgia state courts operated under a local 
pleading rule that required the court to construe pleading allegations in 
favor of the defendant.25 In faithfully following the local pleading rule, the 
state court inferred that Brown had been injured due to his own negli-
gence.26 The Georgia state court thus sustained the Railway’s demurrer and 
dismissed the case.27 
The Supreme Court reversed.28 It determined that Brown’s allegations 
were su.cient to permit a jury to infer negligence on the part of the 
Railway under FELA.29 In doing so, the Court noted that “the [allegations] 
if proven would show an injury of the precise kind for which Congress has 
provided a recovery [in FELA].”30 The Court added that “[s]trict local rules 
of pleading cannot be used to impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of 
recovery authorized by federal laws.”31  
Thus, Brown framed the reverse-Erie problem as a question of the extent 
to which a state rule can interfere with the e-ectuation of a federal statute’s 
purpose. This insight laid the foundation for the Court’s subsequent 
reverse-Erie jurisprudence. 
 
16 Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., )(" U.S. )$* (!*$"). 
17 Felder v. Casey, (&% U.S. !)! (!*&&). 
18 Johnson v. Fankell, $"' U.S. *!! (!**%). 
19 Brown, ))& U.S. at "*(.  
20 Id. 
21 See ($ U.S.C. § $! ("''#) (“Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in com-
merce between any of the several States or Territories . . . shall be liable in damages to any person 
su-ering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce . . . .”). 
22 Brown, ))& U.S. at "*(. 
23 Clinkers are jagged pieces of rock that are the byproduct of burning coal. 
24 Id. at "*%. 
25 Id. at "*$. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at "**. 
29 Id. at "*&. 
30 Id. at "*%. 
31 Id. at "*&. 
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B. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co. 
Only three years after Brown, the Court decided the second of its four 
seminal reverse-Erie cases—Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad 
Co.32 Dice was a railroad ,reman who ,led a FELA negligence claim in 
Ohio state court against his employer, a railroad company, after being 
injured during a work accident.33 The railroad defended the claim by 
producing a document signed by the ,reman releasing the railroad from all 
liability for a sum of money.34 Dice claimed that the railroad fraudulently 
induced him to sign the document.35 
A jury ruled in favor of Dice, ,nding fraud on the part of the railroad, 
but the trial court subsequently entered a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict.36 The trial court ruled that, under Ohio law, it was Dice’s responsi-
bility to read the release document before signing it, regardless of any 
fraud.37 On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court found that state law, not 
federal law, governed the validity of the release and a.rmed the trial 
court’s judgment.38 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.39 The Court began by noting that 
the issue before the Court—the validity of a release under FELA—was a 
federal issue to be determined by reference to federal law.40 However, no 
federal common law existed on this topic.41 When a court determines that 
an issue is to be decided in reference to federal common law, but no perti-
nent common law yet exists, the court can either (!) create a uniform judge-
made federal rule; or (") adopt state law as the federal rule of decision.42 
The Court held that incorporating state law as a federal rule of decision 
would be inconsistent with the “general policy of the Act to give railroad 
employees a right to recover just compensation for injuries negligently 
 
32 )(" U.S. )$* (!*$"). 
33 Id. at )#'. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at )#!. 
39 Id. at )#(. 
40 Id. at )#!. 
41 Id. 
42 See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., $'' U.S. *', *" (!**!) (adopting a state rule 
of demand futility as the federal rule of decision in a stockholder derivative action brought under a 
federal statute); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., ((' U.S. %!$, %)* (!*%*) (adopting state law 
as the federal rule of decision regarding the priority of liens arising from federal government 
lending programs); see also generally Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and 
Credit and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, %! CORNELL L. REV. %)), %$%-$& (!*&#). 
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in+icted by their employers.”43 Based on this ,nding, the Court announced 
a uniform judge-made rule that a release to a FELA claim is void if fraudu-
lently induced.44 
The Court additionally held that the state practice of having a judge 
rather than a jury determine certain aspects of fraud was improper.45 It 
explained that “[t]he right to trial by jury is a basic and fundamental feature 
of our system of federal jurisprudence and that it is part and parcel of the 
remedy a-orded railroad workers under [FELA].”46 
Where Brown understood reverse-Erie to be a question as to what extent 
a state rule could inhibit the vindication of a federal statute’s purpose, Dice 
provided the theoretical basis for that inquiry. The Court could engage in 
the Brown inquiry because reverse-Erie presented questions that were to be 
determined in reference to federal law.  
C. Felder v. Casey 
After Dice, over thirty-,ve years passed before the Court decided its 
next meaningful reverse-Erie case—Felder v. Casey.47 Felder was a Wisconsin 
citizen who was stopped by Milwaukee police o.cers for questioning.48 An 
altercation ensued and Felder ,led a § !*&) action nine months later against 
the o.cers for violating his federal constitutional rights.49 The o.cers 
moved to dismiss the claim for failure to satisfy a Wisconsin notice-of-claim 
requirement that required a plainti- suing a state or local o.cer to notify 
the o-icer within !"' days of the alleged injury of his intent to ,le suit.50 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the state notice-of-claim provi-
sion was applicable.51 It reasoned that a party that chooses to bring a federal 
action in state court must abide by state procedures.52 It further noted that 
the remedial and deterrent goals of § !*&) were not compromised by the 
state notice-of-claim provision and that the state had legitimate interests in 
enacting a notice-of-claim provision.53 
 
43 Dice, )(" U.S. at )#". 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at )#). 
46 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
47 (&% U.S. !)!, !)( (!*&&). 
48 Id. 
49 Felder, (&% U.S. at !)$. 
50 Id. at !)$-)#. 
51 Id. at !)%. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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Yet again, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.54 In doing so, the Court 
noted that the reverse-Erie question is a question of obstacle preemption.55 
The Court began by holding that the state notice-of-claim provision was not 
a neutral and uniformly applicable state rule of procedure56 and was incon-
sistent with the remedial aims of § !*&).57 In light of these two facts, it 
noted that any legitimate reasons that the state had for enacting such a 
notice-of-claim provision were immaterial.58  
The Court then went a step further and, citing Erie, held that the state 
provision was also obstacle preempted by § !*&) because it was outcome-
determinative.59 The state provision “predictably alter[ed] the outcome 
of § !*&) claims depending solely on whether they [were] brought in state 
or federal court.”60 Finally, the Court noted that the state rule “discrimi-
nate[d]” against the federal statute because it applied only to the precise 
type of action that the federal statute authorized—a claim against a gov-
ernmental defendant.61 
Felder changed the landscape of the reverse-Erie inquiry. Although the 
Court had undertaken the traditional Brown inquiry, rather than embracing 
the Dice theory that reverse-Erie problems presented federal issues to be 
determined in reference to federal law, the Felder Court framed the inquiry 
in the language of preemption. In addition to this theoretical shift, the 
Court introduced three new tests that asked (!) whether the state rule was 
of uniform and neutral applicability; (") whether the application of the state 
rule was outcome-determinative; and ()) whether the state rule discriminated 
against the federal right.  
 
54 Id. at !)&. 
55 Id. (“The question before us today . . . is essentially one of pre-emption: . . . does the 
enforcement of [the state] requirement . . . ‘stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, )!" U.S. 
$", #% (!*(!)). 
56 A neutral and uniformly applicable state rule of procedure is also known as a transsubstantive 
rule. Transsubstantive “procedural” rules are rules that apply to all cases regardless of their subject 
matter. In the state law context, such rules would be found in the states’ equivalent of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
57 Felder, (&% U.S. at !((-($. 
58 Id. at !().  
59 Id. at !$! & !$). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at !(#. 
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D. Johnson v. Fankell 
The Court’s ,nal meaningful reverse-Erie case came almost ten years 
later in Johnson v. Fankell.62 Fankell, a terminated Idaho state employee, 
,led a § !*&) action against state o.cials, alleging a violation of her due 
process rights.63 The state o.cials moved to dismiss based on quali,ed 
immunity.64 The trial court denied the state o.cials’ motion, and the Idaho 
Supreme Court dismissed the o.cials’ appeal of that decision.65 In dismiss-
ing the appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a denial of a motion to 
dismiss for quali,ed immunity was not appealable under state law.66 
This time the U.S. Supreme Court a.rmed.67 The Court began by 
observing that the rule regarding the appealability of the denial of a pretrial 
motion was “a neutral state Rule regarding the administration of the state 
courts.”68 Citing Felder, the Court then held that the state rule was not 
outcome-determinative because the denial of a motion to dismiss for 
quali,ed immunity would be reviewable by the state courts after a trial.69 
The Court noted that, unlike Felder, the state rule did not “discriminate” 
against the federal right.70  
Finally, the Court found no right to an interlocutory appeal in § !*&) 
itself.71 Rather, the Court noted that the right to such an appeal is found in 
"& U.S.C. § !"*!,72 a statute that has no application to state courts.73 It 
concluded that § !*&) did not preempt the state rule.74 
Thus, Johnson cemented the modern approach to reverse-Erie that the 
Court had established in Felder. The Court now treats reverse-Erie prob-
lems as questions of preemption, rather than viewing them as matters to be 
decided in reference to federal law as it did in Dice. Additionally, the Court 
continues to apply the concept from Brown and Dice that a state rule may 
 
62 $"' U.S. *!! (!**%). 
63 Id. at *!).  
64 Id. 
65 Id. at *!)-!(. 
66 Id. at *!(. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at *!&. 
69 Id. at *"!. 
70 Id. at *!& n.*. 
71 Id. at *"! n.!". 
72 "& U.S.C. § !"*! ("'!") (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from 
all ,nal decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .”). A ruling on quali,ed immunity 
would be appealable in federal court pursuant to § !"*! under the collateral order doctrine. 
Mitchell v. Forsyth, (%" U.S. $!!, $)' (!*&$). 
73 Johnson, $"' U.S. at *"! n.!". 
74 Id. at *"). 
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have to yield when it con+icts with the purpose of a federal statute. However, 
unlike in Brown and Dice, the Court also uses the neutral and uniformly 
applicable state rule test, the outcome-determination test, and the state rule 
discrimination test in deciding whether a state rule will be preempted. 
With an understanding of the Court’s four seminal reverse-Erie cases, 
Part II discusses why the three cases that resulted in new federal rules—
Brown, Dice, and Felder—were instances of federal common law making. 
II. REVERSE-ERIE AS FEDERAL COMMON LAW MAKING 
As Part I explains, the modern Court views reverse-Erie as a problem of 
obstacle preemption. There are two ways to view the task performed by the 
Court when it preempts a state rule: the Court is either engaging in statutory 
interpretation or federal common law making.75 A careful examination of 
the Court’s reverse-Erie cases leads to the conclusion that the Court is 
fashioning federal common law in these cases, rather than engaging in mere 
statutory interpretation.  
Over time, two general de,nitions of federal common law have 
emerged, one broad and one narrow. Under the broad de,nition, a court 
engages in common law making if it is looking beyond the text of a statute 
when it formulates a legal rule to ,ll a gap in a statute.76 An alternative 
formulation of this broad view states that a court creates federal common 
law when the text of a statute does not clearly suggest the resulting legal 
rule.77  
The broad view of common law has intuitive appeal. It strains the Eng-
lish language to consider a legal rule that is not provided for or clearly 
suggested by the text of a statute to be the product of statutory (i.e., 
textual) interpretation. What is being interpreted when a court engages in 
statutory interpretation if not the meaning of the words of the statute itself?  
The broad view easily encompasses the Court’s reverse-Erie cases. In 
Brown and Dice, the Court never identi,ed an express provision of FELA 
that explicitly addressed or clearly suggested pleading requirements, the 
validity of releases, or the requirement of a jury trial. Similarly, in Felder, 
the Court did not identify an express provision of § !*&) that explicitly 
 
75 Caleb Nelson, Preemption, &# VA. L. REV. ""$, "%& ("'''). 
76 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, $" U. CHI. L. REV. !, % 
(!*&$) (“[F]ederal common law . . . refers to legal rules (substantive or procedural) that . . . are 
not found on the face of an authoritative federal text . . . .”).  
77 See Field, supra note !", at &*' (stating that federal common law is “any rule of federal law 
created by a court (usually but not invariably a federal court) when the substance of that rule is not 
clearly suggested by federal enactments” (footnote omitted)). 
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addressed or clearly suggested any notice-of-claim requirement or lack of 
notice-of-claim requirement. Under the broad view, the Court was creating 
common law in all three cases. 
In contrast, some scholars prefer a narrow view that places federal com-
mon law and statutory interpretation on a continuum instead of using a 
bright-line rule. The oft-quoted maxim of this approach is that “[t]he 
di-erence between ‘common law’ and ‘statutory interpretation’ is a di-er-
ence in emphasis rather than a di-erence in kind.”78  
Under this narrow view, the inquiry focuses on whether a court is looking 
beyond the speci,c intent of the drafters of the legislation and trying to 
ascertain their general intent.79 The proponents of this narrow view presumably 
use the continuum to deal with tough in-between cases where it is unclear 
whether a court is following the speci,c intentions of the draftsmen or more 
general intentions in ,lling in a gap in a statute. 
None of the Court’s reverse-Erie cases fall in this in-between zone. No-
where in Brown did the Court identify any potential speci,c intent of 
Congress regarding pleading requirements for FELA actions. Rather, the 
Court based its “new”80 pleading requirement for FELA actions on the 
proposition that the facts set out in the complaint “if proven would show an 
injury of the precise kind for which Congress has provided a recovery.”81 
This proposition is fairly characterized as the general intent of Congress 
that plainti-s with such allegations should have their day in court. 
Similarly, in Dice, the Court based its new jury requirement in FELA 
actions on the fact that a jury trial was “part and parcel of the remedy 
a-orded railroad workers under [FELA].”82 The Court failed to point to 
any speci,c intent of Congress to support this proposition83 but found it 
su.cient that “[t]he right to trial by jury is a basic and fundamental feature 
 
78 Peter Westen & Je-rey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, %& 
MICH. L. REV. )!!, ))" (!*&'). 
79 See Merrill, supra note %#, at $ (“[Under the narrow] view, federal common law is not 
qualitatively di-erent from textual interpretation, but rather is an extension of it, with ‘interpreta-
tion’ now understood in a broader sense than the search for the speci,c intentions of the 
draftsmen.”). 
80 The term “new” is used in this context to mean that the rule was not provided for by statute 
or prior common law. 
81 Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., ))& U.S. "*(, "*% (!*(*). 
82 Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., )(" U.S. )$*, )#) (!*$") (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
83 See id. at )#%-#& (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[FELA] does not require a State to have 
juries for negligence actions brought under the Federal Act in its courts. . . . Nothing in [FELA] 
or in the judicial enforcement of the Act for over forty years forces such judicial hybridization 
upon the States.”).  
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of our system of federal jurisprudence.”84 This reasoning supports the view 
that the Court was looking to Congress’s general intent. Congress legislated 
against the backdrop of this principle and thus the principle’s continued 
vitality was part of Congress’s general intent.85 
As for the Court’s new rule in Dice regarding the validity of a release of 
a FELA claim, the Court was more explicit that it was following the general 
intent of Congress. In declaring the rule that a fraudulently obtained release 
of a FELA claim was not valid, the Court noted that “[a]pplication of [the 
opposite] rule to defeat a railroad employee's claim is wholly incongruous 
with the general policy of the Act to give railroad employees a right to recover 
just compensation for injuries negligently in+icted by their employers.”86 
Finally, in Felder, the Court did not identify any speci,c intent of Con-
gress not to have a notice-of-claim requirement in § !*&) actions, such as a 
proposed, but rejected, notice-of-claim amendment to § !*&).87 Rather, the 
Court based its decision on the notion that a notice-of-claim requirement 
was inconsistent with the “compensatory goals of the federal legislation”88—
in other words, the general intent of Congress. Speci,cally, the Court 
found “the notion that a State could require civil rights victims to seek 
compensation from o-ending state o.cials before they could assert a 
federal action in state court” to be “utterly inconsistent with the remedial 
purposes” of § !*&).89 
Thus, under either the broad or narrow de,nition of common law, the 
Court created common law in its three reverse-Erie cases that resulted in a 
new federal rule—Brown, Dice, and Felder. In all three cases, the Court used 
the general intent of the enacting Congress to ,ll in a statutory gap, rather 
than developing a rule provided for or clearly suggested by the text of the 
statute in question.  
Once one understands that the Court is creating federal common law in 
its reverse-Erie cases, the question becomes: What are the limits on the 
power of the Court to create federal common law? It is here that the RDA 
enters the conversation.  
 
84 Id. at )#) (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
85 See Allison C. Giles, Note, The Value of Nonlegislators’ Contributions to Legislative History, %* 
GEO. L.J. )$*, )&' (!**') (noting that Congress’s general intent can be illuminated by examining 
the “background against which Congress was operating when it enacted the statute”). 
86 Dice, )(" U.S. at )#" (emphasis added). 
87 See infra note ")(. 
88 Felder v. Casey, (&% U.S. !)!, !() (!*&&). 
89 Id. at !(*. 
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III. THE RULES OF DECISION ACT AS A LIMITATION ON FEDERAL 
COMMON LAW MAKING 
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of 
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be 
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United 
States, in cases where they apply.90  
These words limit the power of federal courts to create uniform judge-
made rules (i.e., make common law)91 to situations in which the Constitu-
tion or a federal statute “require[s] or provide[s].”92  
The “provide” language encompasses areas where the Constitution or 
Acts of Congress are interpreted to grant the judiciary the power to fashion 
an entire body of federal common law. For example, the Constitution 
provides that “[t]he judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend . . . to 
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”93 Federal courts have 
seen this as an implicit grant of power to the federal judiciary to fashion a 
body of federal admiralty common law.94 This same logic can be applied to 
other bodies of federal common law based on similar provisions in the 
Constitution95 or in federal statutes.96 
 
90 "& U.S.C. § !#$" ("'!") (emphasis added). 
91 In common usage, a court “makes” or “creates” federal common law when it develops a 
uniform judge-made rule instead of adopting state law as a federal rule of decision. This Comment 
uses those terms in that spirit. However, for the sake of analytical precision, it is important to note 
that the act of “making” or “creating” federal common law is recognizing that an issue is to be 
determined in reference to a federal rule of decision. Thus, a court truly “makes” or “creates” 
federal common law both when it develops a uniform judge-made rule and when it adopts state 
law as a federal rule of decision. 
92 See D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., )!$ U.S. ((%, (#* (!*(") ( Jack-
son, J., concurring) (“[F]ederal courts may not apply their own notions of the common law at 
variance with applicable state decisions except ‘where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the 
United States [so] require or provide.’” (second alteration in original)); Burbank, supra note (", at 
%$* (arguing that the creation of federal common law must be justi,ed based on the language of 
the Rules of Decision Act). 
93 U.S. CONST. art. III, § ". 
94 Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, &) NOTRE DAME L. REV. !#)*, 
!#(" ("''&). 
95 See, e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., )'( U.S. *", !!' (!*)&) 
(,nding, based on the language of Article III, that the apportionment of water in an interstate 
stream is a matter of federal common law); see also Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and 
International Law, (! VAND. L. REV. !"'$, !"(( (!*&&) (identifying other bodies of federal 
common law that are justi,ed in reference to “an explicit jurisdictional grant in article III,” such as 
interstate boundaries, riparian boundaries, and transactions in which the federal government is a 
participant). 
96 The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) is an example of a federal statute that, as interpreted, provides 
for the judiciary to fashion a body of common law. See "& U.S.C. § !)$' ("'!") (“The district 
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In this way, the “provide” language can be seen as charging the judiciary 
to create federal common law when the designated sources of law, as 
interpreted, speak to that question directly, whereas the “require” language 
can be seen as charging the judiciary to create federal common law when the 
designated sources of law, as interpreted, “require” it in order to e-ect 
federal policy.  
This Part does not continue to discuss the relatively straightforward 
“provide” language. Rather, it focuses on the “require” language to deter-
mine when a statute “require[s]” that something other than state law 
provide the rule of decision (i.e., when Congress wishes the Court to 
develop a uniform judge-made rule). 
A. Two Common Misconceptions About Federal Common Law Making—
Preemption and Separation of Powers 
In plain English, the RDA is a directive from Congress to all federal 
courts to use state law as a federal rule of decision in federal court unless the 
Constitution or a federal statute “otherwise require[s].”97 Thus, the RDA is 
an instruction from Congress as to when a federal court should use a 
uniform judge-made federal rule and when a federal court should use 
existing state law as a federal rule.98  
The necessary antecedent to Congress providing the Court with such a 
directive is that Congress itself has the power to choose which sovereign’s 
law should be used as the federal rule of decision in federal court.99 It has 
this power under its authority to make laws which “shall be necessary and 
proper” for the functioning of the federal courts and for the exercise of its 
Article I legislative powers.100  
 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, $(" 
U.S. #*", %)" ("''() (recognizing that the ATS provides for the federal judiciary to “recognize 
private claims under federal common law for violations of . . . [certain] international law 
norm[s]”). But see id. at %() (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(arguing that the ATS is merely a jurisdictional statute that does not authorize the federal 
judiciary to create a body of federal common law). In this case, since the federal courts’ interpretation 
of the text of the ATS would result in the creation of uniform judge-made rules, the statute would 
“provide” for the creation of federal common law. 
97 "& U.S.C. § !#$" ("'!"). 
98 See Westen & Lehman, supra note %&, at )!# (“[T]he court applies the appropriate state 
law . . . because Congress, through the Rules of Decision Act, has chosen to use state law as a 
federal rule of decision.” (emphasis added)). 
99 If Congress does not have this power, then it cannot possibly direct the Court in the RDA 
to determine how to exercise this power. Cf. Merrill, supra note %#, at !! (“[T]he question of the 
power of federal courts to make law should precede questions about the content of that law.”). 
100 U.S. CONST. art. I, § &, cl. !&. 
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Recognizing Congress’s power to choose whether courts should create a 
federal rule or use a state rule as a federal rule in federal court (i.e., power 
to promulgate the RDA) is critical to understanding why the Court is 
wrong in framing its reverse-Erie cases as preemption cases. Preemption is 
an appropriate term only when the “preempted” rule would govern of its 
own force in the absence of the supposed “preemptive” rule.101 
Going back to ,rst principles (i.e., a world without the RDA), in federal 
court, state law does not govern of its own force in the absence of a federal 
rule.102 The only reason state law would apply in federal court is because 
Congress, which has the independent constitutional power to legislate in 
the area, has chosen state law. The ultimate choice between state law and 
federal law rests with Congress, and the resultant rule is always a federal rule 
of decision regardless of the source of the rule’s content.  
Reintroducing the RDA, the only reason state law would apply in federal 
court is because the Court has determined, pursuant to Congress’s instruction 
in the RDA, that a federal statute does not “require” a uniform judge-made 
rule.103 Viewed in this light, the separation of powers concerns that some 
scholars express with respect to federal common law making by federal 
courts104 lose their force. Although the Court may be exercising congressional 
power to make a choice between creating a uniform judge-made rule and 
adopting state law as a federal rule, it is doing so as part of a constitutionally 
permissible delegation of power.  
The RDA represents a delegation by Congress of its power to choose 
whether the Court should use state law or a uniform judge-made federal 
rule in any given situation. This delegation is permissible as long as it is 
accompanied by an “intelligible principle” by which the Court can exercise 
 
101 See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act, "* U.S.C. § !!(((a) ("'!") (expressly 
“supersed[ing]” existing state law “relat[ing] to any employee bene,t plan”). 
102 The only exception to this proposition is in those rare situations where the Constitution 
requires federal courts to apply state law. See Burbank, supra note (", at %$# & n.** (“So long as 
federal courts exist and have jurisdiction to adjudicate cases in which the Constitution requires 
them to apply state law, that law may be said without linguistic strain to govern ‘of its own 
force.’”). 
103 Cf. Westen & Lehman, supra note %&, at )$* (“[H]aving refrained from creating a rule of 
decision . . . Congress can be constitutionally presumed to have intended to choose state law.” 
(emphasis added)). 
104 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, !(( U. PA. 
L. REV. !"($, !"$$ (!**#) (“The rise of federal common law is problematic because such law 
is . . . in tension with important features of the constitutional structure, particularly . . . the 
separation of powers.”); Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes 
and the Nondelegation Doctrine, &! S. CAL. L. REV. ('$, ()# ("''&) (“Although typically associated 
with delegations to agencies, the constitutional principles on which the nondelegation doctrine is 
based apply with full force to delegations to courts.”). 
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the delegated power.105 The explicit “intelligible principle” which would 
make the delegation permissible is the language of the RDA. In the RDA, 
Congress directs the Court that it should always use state law as the rule of 
decision unless the Constitution or a federal statute “otherwise require[s] or 
provide[s].”106 Since the Court is following this intelligible principle from 
Congress, rather than engaging in an independent assessment of the merits 
of a federal uniform rule versus incorporating state law, there is no separa-
tion of powers problem in this regard.107 
There may be a residual separation of powers concern with respect to 
the fact that, once the Court determines that a federal statute has “required” 
a uniform judge-made rule, it must then provide the content of that uni-
form judge-made rule. However, this concern is not as great as it seems at 
,rst glance. The Court is not developing a rule “untethered to a genuinely 
identi,able (as opposed to judicially constructed) federal policy.”108 Rather, 
the content of the rule is informed and guided by the general intent of 
Congress through its statute.109 
Although some may suggest, using nondelegation terms, that the general 
intent of Congress is not an explicit “intelligible principle” that can guide 
the judiciary’s development of a uniform rule, the Court has previously 
been comfortable with implicit intelligible principles in the form of federal 
policy.110 There is no reason why the general intent of Congress in a federal 
 
105 See Mistretta v. United States, (&& U.S. )#!, )%" (!*&*) (“So long as Congress shall lay 
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise 
the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden 
delegation of legislative power.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
106 "& U.S.C. § !#$" ("'!").  
107 Cf. Westen & Lehman, supra note %&, at )(! (suggesting that, even if the Court incorrectly 
divines that Congress required the creation a uniform judge-made rule, that decision would not be 
such an “egregious” abuse of the Court’s statutory interpretation authority to rise to the level of a 
separation of powers violation). 
108 O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., $!" U.S. %*, &* (!**(); see also Burbank, 
supra note (", at %&*-*' (“Federal courts are not free to conjure up ‘interests’; rather, they must 
tie them to policies already articulated in, or at least articulable from, valid legal prescriptions.”). 
109 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., )$) U.S. ((&, ($!-$% 
(!*$%) (developing a federal common law rule providing for speci,c performance of arbitration 
clauses in collective bargaining agreements based on the general intent of Congress in a statute); 
supra notes &!-&* and accompanying text; cf. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., ((' U.S. %!$, 
%)& (!*%*) (“[I]n fashioning federal principles to govern areas left open by Congress, our function 
is to e-ectuate congressional policy.”). 
110 See, e.g., Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, )"* U.S. *', !'( (!*(#) (rejecting a claim of 
violation of separation of powers in a congressional delegation of power to the SEC where the 
intelligible principle was not explicit, but rather was “derive[d] . . . from the purpose of the Act, 
its factual background and the statutory context in which [it] appear[ed]”); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 
"*) U.S. )&&, (!# (!*)$) (determining whether there was a violation of separation of powers in a 
congressional delegation of power to the President by “examin[ing] the context to ascertain if it 
 
  
 !"%& University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. !#": !"#! 
 
statute cannot be seen as an implicit intelligible principle as part of a 
constitutionally permissible delegation of power to the judiciary.111 This 
view placates separation of powers concerns about the Court specifying the 
content of a uniform judge-made rule. 
B. Three Common Misconceptions About the Rules of Decision Act— 
“Rules of Decision,” “In Cases Where They Apply,”  
and “In the Courts of the United States” 
The argument could be made that the RDA does not apply to reverse-
Erie cases because the term “rules of decision” denotes substantive rather 
than procedural law. As an initial matter, resort to substance–procedure 
labels as a proxy for the meaning of “rules of decision” is imprecise and 
distracts from a real discussion of whether the RDA applies.112 It is also 
unhelpful because the Court sometimes ,nds a rule to be both substantive 
and procedural.113  
In its cases that reference the RDA, the Court does not follow a procedure–
substance construction of the term “rules of decision.” The Court has 
implicated the RDA twice when assessing whether state statutes of 
limitations con+icted with federal policy.114 While a statute of limitations 
 
furnishes a declaration of policy or a standard of action, which can be deemed to relate to the 
[statute] and thus to imply what is not there expressed”); cf. Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Coopera-
tive Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, $" VAND. L. REV. !, * (!***) (“[D]elegation to an 
agency can be implicit as well as explicit.”). 
111 Professor Thomas Merrill advances two arguments that the separation of powers concerns 
in the context of delegations of power to the judiciary are greater than that of delegations to 
agencies: (!) agencies, unlike the judiciary, are accountable to the electorate through the President; 
and (") agency decisions are reviewable by the courts. Merrill, supra note %#, at (! n.!&".  
However, just as agencies are accountable to the electorate through the President, the federal 
judiciary is accountable to the electorate through Congress, which has the power to change the 
“intelligible principle” it has given the courts. Moreover, just as agency decisions are reviewable 
by the courts, the federal judiciary’s decisions on the creation of common law are reviewable by 
Congress. See infra note !$* and accompanying text (noting that Congress always retains the 
power to abrogate federal common law). 
112 Cf. infra notes !&!-&% and accompanying text (outlining the dangers of using these labels 
in reverse-Erie cases). 
113 See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., $!& U.S. (!$, ("# (!**#) (,nding a New York 
state rule that allowed its appellate courts to review and set aside excessive jury verdicts to be both 
“substantive” and “procedural”); cf. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, (&# U.S. %!%, %"% (!*&&) (“[T]he 
words ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ themselves . . . do not have a precise content, even (indeed 
especially) as their usage has evolved.”). 
114 See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Du- & Assocs., Inc., (&) U.S. !(), !(% (!*&%) 
(“[T]he Rules of Decision Act . . . requires application of state statutes of limitations unless a 
timeliness rule drawn from elsewhere in federal law should be applied.” (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted)); id. at !#"-#) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (recognizing that 
the RDA applies to a situation where a state statute of limitations con+icts with the vindication of 
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skirts the substance–procedure boundary, the Court still implicated the 
RDA.115  
Rather, scholars have de,ned a “rule of decision” as “any rule by which 
issues in a case are decided.”116 Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary de,nes a 
“rule of decision” as a “rule, statute, body of law, or prior decision that 
provides the basis for deciding or adjudicating a case.”117 Under this de,ni-
tion, any rule, procedural or substantive, quali,es as a rule of decision if it is 
the basis for deciding a case. The Court’s statute of limitations cases that 
reference the RDA embrace this de,nition as they were decided in the 
lower courts on the basis of the statutes of limitation. 
Applying this de,nition to the Court’s reverse-Erie cases, it appears that 
the state rules in question were “rules of decision” in three out of four cases. 
In Brown, the state pleading rule was the basis upon which the state courts 
dismissed Brown’s case.118 In Dice, the state rule regarding fraudulent 
releases was the basis upon which the state courts denied recovery to 
Dice.119 In addition, the state practice of allowing a judge to determine 
fraud notwithstanding the jury’s verdict for Dice was the basis upon which 
he lost the case.120 In Felder, the state notice-of-claim provision was the 
basis upon which Felder’s case was dismissed in the state courts.121 However, 
in Johnson, the state rule about whether to allow an interlocutory appeal was 
not the basis for deciding the case because the appeal was interlocutory—
the case had not been decided yet.122 
 
a federal right); DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, (#" U.S. !$!, !$* n.!) (!*&)) (recognizing 
that the RDA is implicated in determining whether a state statute of limitations should be applied 
to a federal cause of action); id. at !%( n.! (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (same); id. at !%)-%( (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (using the RDA as a basis for borrowing state statute of limitations as a federal rule 
of decision).  
115 See Sun Oil, (&# U.S. at %)# (“The statute of limitations a State enacts represents a bal-
ance between, on the one hand, its substantive interest in vindicating substantive claims and, on 
the other hand, a combination of its procedural interest in freeing its courts from adjudicating 
stale claims and its substantive interest in giving individuals repose from ancient breaches of 
law.”). 
116 Westen & Lehman, supra note %&, at )## n.!#$ (internal quotation marks omitted). 
117 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY !((& (*th ed. "''*). 
118 ))& U.S. "*(, "*& (!*(*). 
119 )(" U.S. )$*, )#" (!*$").  
120 Id. at )#). 
121 (&% U.S. !)!, !$"-$) (!*&&).  
122 $"' U.S. *!!, *""-") (!**%). This Comment nevertheless extracts lessons from Johnson as 
to the Court’s conformity (or lack thereof ) to the RDA limit on its power to fashion common law 
because the Court did not make a distinction between Johnson and its three other reverse-Erie 
cases. It is fair to say that, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, the Court believed that 
it was operating under the RDA in Johnson just as it was in the other reverse-Erie cases. Cf. infra 
notes !)$-)* and accompanying text (arguing that the Court’s federal common law cases that do 
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Under this de,nition of “rules of decision,” the Court’s preoccupation 
with “outcome-determination” to decide whether a uniform judge-made 
rule is warranted in the reverse-Erie context is puzzling. The Court de,ned 
“outcome-determination” in Johnson as a-ecting the “ultimate disposition of 
the case.”123 This is just another way of saying “the basis for deciding the 
case.” Thus, when a state rule is outcome-determinative, it is also necessarily 
a rule of decision, and the RDA is then implicated. If a state rule is not 
outcome-determinative, then it is not a rule of decision and the RDA is not 
implicated.124  
The Court’s analysis of outcome-determination thus is not a helpful tool 
in assessing Congress’s intent concerning the creation of a uniform judge-
made rule or adoption of state law as the federal rule of decision. Rather, 
the outcome-determination test is a useful inquiry only for asking whether, 
as an initial matter, the RDA is even implicated. 
 Some legal scholars have also suggested that the language of “in cases 
where they apply” limits the RDA’s reach to diversity cases.125 This would 
render the RDA inapplicable to reverse-Erie cases, which are, by de,nition, 
federal question cases in state court. The problem is that there is no actual 
evidence to support it this argument.126 Furthermore, commentators have 
advanced compelling reasons against such a narrow interpretation.127 
Finally, some argue that the language stating that the RDA applies only 
to “the courts of the United States” renders the RDA inapplicable to state 
 
not reference the RDA can serve as implicit interpretations of it). Thus, the Court’s treatment of 
the legal issues in Johnson provides valuable insight into its conformity with the RDA theory of 
federal common law making advanced in this Comment. 
123 $"' U.S. at *"!. 
124 What the Court should do in a situation where a state rule that is not a rule of decision 
and a federal rule con+ict, as was the case in Johnson, is beyond the scope of this Comment. For 
the purposes of this Comment, it su.ces to say that the RDA would not be implicated as a 
limitation on the power of the Court to fashion a uniform judge-made rule. 
125 See David P. Currie, On Blazing Trails: Judge Friendly and Federal Jurisdiction, !)) U. PA. L. 
REV. $, & n."% (!*&() (characterizing the diversity-only view as a “popular rumor”). 
126 See Campbell v. Haverhill, !$$ U.S. #!', #!(-!# (!&*$) (rejecting the claim that the RDA 
applies only to diversity cases because the RDA “neither contains nor suggests such a distinc-
tion”); Westen & Lehman, supra note %&, at )##-#& (stating that neither the RDA nor Erie 
jurisprudence support this view). 
127 See, e.g., Note, Clear,eld: Clouded Field of Federal Common Law, $) COLUM. L. REV. **!, 
**(-*$ (!*$)) (arguing against the diversity-only reading by noting that (!) the First Congress 
could have speci,ed that the RDA applied only to diversity cases if it so desired; (") a diversity-
only interpretation would leave the federal courts without a congressional directive on how to 
proceed in nondiversity cases; and ()) the federal courts have applied the RDA in nondiversity 
cases in the past); cf. supra note !!( and accompanying text (citing federal question cases where the 
Court implicated the RDA). 
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courts.128 This proposition ignores the widely accepted view that a state 
court must decide a matter of federal law as it believes that the U.S. 
Supreme Court—which is constrained by the RDA—would decide the 
issue.129 In this way, the RDA constrains a state court’s ability to create a 
uniform judge-made rule or use state law as a federal rule of decision even 
though the RDA’s language does not explicitly constrain state courts.130 
With these ,ve misconceptions about federal common law making and 
the RDA clari,ed, we can now examine how the RDA serves as a limit on 
federal common law making. 
C. The Nature of the RDA Limit on Federal Common Law Making 
The Rules of Decision Act has been the subject of renewed scholarly 
attention since the Court interpreted it in Erie. The cryptic language of the 
RDA has led to divergent theories of how the RDA constrains the ability of 
federal courts to create common law. 
!. A Troubled RDA Theory of Federal Common Law Making 
One theory of the RDA limit on federal common law making focuses on 
the Supremacy Clause. Under this theory, federal courts have the authority 
 
128 See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, The Curious Notion that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme 
Federal Common Law, &) NW. U. L. REV. &#', &#$ (!*&*). 
129 See La Bonte v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., !#% N.E."d #"*, #)" (Mass. 
!*#') (“Since the Supreme Court has not spoken on . . . . [the validity of FELA releases], we are 
obliged to decide the question as we think that court would decide it.”); City of Lancaster v. 
Chambers, &&) S.W."d #$', #$&-$* (Tex. !**() (“When deciding issues of federal law, we ,nd 
ourselves in the unique role . . . of an intermediate appellate court, anticipating the manner in 
which the United States Supreme Court would decide the issue presented.”); Stephen B. Burbank, 
Federal Judgments Law: Sources of Authority and Sources of Rules, %' TEX. L. REV. !$$!, !$$* n.$! 
(!**") (noting that, since state court decisions on federal common law are reviewable by the 
Supreme Court, state courts should decide questions of federal common law as they believe the 
Supreme Court would decide those questions); Clermont, supra note (, at )!-)" (same); Field, 
supra note !", at &*' n.)' (same); cf. Bellia, supra note !(, at *'%-'& (arguing that state courts that 
“create” federal common law have the authority to do so only “when [they] make[] law as a 
necessary consequence of [their] best e-orts to apply existing principles of federal law” because 
“[t]he speci,c intent of the Supremacy Clause was to preclude individual states from making their 
own judgments of what national policy should be”); Clermont, supra note (, at )' (“Sometimes the 
state court has to be the very ,rst to enunciate federal law. It has authority to do so, if it decides in 
accordance with existing federal law by trying to discern what the federal courts would decide is 
the law, rather than by undertaking to formulate federal law either in pursuit of strictly forward-
looking policies that might guide a legislature or in accordance with nonpositivist principles that 
might guide a freely law-creating court.”). 
130 Cf. infra note !%! and accompanying text (outlining the ways in which Congress can indi-
rectly compel state courts to use substance-speci,c “procedural” rules). 
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to fashion federal common law when the Supremacy Clause “requires.”131 
Proponents argue that the Supremacy Clause “requires” the creation of 
federal common law when a federal policy is implicated in a court’s choice 
to use a state rule or fashion a uniform judge-made rule.132  
The basis for a court creating a uniform judge-made rule is that any 
con+icting state policy, as expressed in the state rule in question, is subordi-
nate to the federal policy expressed in a federal statute under the Supremacy 
Clause. Accordingly, the Supremacy Clause is said to “require” that the 
court fashion a uniform judge-made rule.  
However, under a plain reading of the text of the Supremacy Clause, 
the Supremacy Clause does not subordinate state policy to federal policy 
because the Supremacy Clause does not apply to inchoate federal policies. 
The Supremacy Clause applies only to federal laws.133 Therefore, the 
Supremacy Clause cannot enter the analysis until a law has been formulated. 
It is not a source from which a court can plausibly justify the creation of a 
law; it is merely a directive to judges that once a federal law has been 
created it is supreme.134  
Viewed in this light, the Supremacy Clause, as an instruction on how to 
treat existing laws, cannot “require” the creation of federal common law in 
the way that a statute, which contains substantive law expressing federal 
policy, can “require” the creation of a uniform judge-made rule. Additionally, 
as a matter of simplicity, why use an extra inferential step to route the 
federal policy embodied in a statute through the Supremacy Clause when 
the federal statute itself “require[s]” that something other than state law 
apply? 
 
131 See Weinberg, supra note !"&, at &#$ (“[T]he supremacy clause requires courts to . . . 
fashion . . . federal case law.”); id. at &%' (“[A]ll courts must work under the federal common law 
when the supremacy clause so ‘requires.’”). 
132 See id. at &%" (“Thus, before federal common law is fashioned for a case, all that can be said 
to be supreme under article VI is inchoate federal policy. But it is supreme nevertheless.”). 
133 See U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
134 See Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., ((! U.S. #'', #!) (!*%*) (“[T]hough [the 
Supremacy Clause] is not a source of any federal rights, it does ‘secure’ federal rights by according 
them priority whenever they come in con+ict with state law. In that sense all federal rights, 
whether created by treaty, by statute, or by regulation, are ‘secured’ by the Supremacy Clause.” 
(footnote omitted)); Burbank, supra note !"*, at !$$* n.$! (“The Supremacy Clause is not a source 
of lawmaking power; it merely states that valid and pertinent federal law is supreme.”). 
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". The Correct RDA Theory of Federal Common Law Making 
Before delving into the proper RDA theory of federal common law making, 
it is important to note that the Supreme Court, by and large, does not 
reference the RDA in its federal common law cases.135 Thus, with few 
exceptions, the cases cited in this subsection do not purport to construe the 
RDA.  
Nevertheless, one can sensibly view all of the Court’s federal common 
law making cases as implicitly interpreting the “require” language of the 
RDA.136 In the few federal common law making cases where members of 
the Court have explicitly viewed the RDA as a constraint on the Court, 
they have proceeded on the basis that a federal statute “requires” a uniform 
judge-made rule where the state rule at issue con+icts with the policy of the 
federal statute137—the same test the Court uses in its federal common law 
making cases that do not reference the RDA.138 This is not surprising given 
the Court’s oft-quoted maxim that the RDA is “no more than a declaration 
of what the law would have been without it.”139 Thus, this Comment 
proceeds on the basis that, even if the Court does not explicitly reference 
the RDA in its federal common law making cases, it is still operating under 
its principles and implicitly construing the RDA.  
As noted in subsection III.C.!, the proper question for the Court to ask 
under an RDA theory of federal common law making is whether Congress, 
through a source of positive federal law, required that something other than 
state law apply. If Congress had, ex ante, made a determination about 
 
135 For rare exceptions to this general proposition, see supra note !!(, and infra note !)%.  
136 Cf. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, &% HARV. L. REV. #*), %"%-)' (!*%() 
(treating Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., ))% U.S. $)$ (!*(*), and Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & 
Warehouse Co., ))% U.S. $)' (!*(*), as interpreting the RDA although the cases d' not reference it). 
137 See, e.g., DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, (#" U.S. !$!, !$* n.!) (!*&)) (concluding 
that the “policies and requirements of the underlying [federal] cause of action” “require or 
provide” for the creation of a uniform judge-made rule); Robertson v. Wegmann, ()# U.S. $&(, 
$*& (!*%&) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Rules of Decision Act cases disregard state law where there 
is con+ict with federal policy, even though no explicit con+ict with the terms of a federal statute 
[exists] . . . .”); Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. 
(UAW) v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., )&) U.S. #*#, %'* (!*##) (White, J., dissenting) (“[S]tate law 
is applied [under the RDA] only because it supplements and ful,lls federal policy, and the 
ultimate question is what federal policy requires.”). 
138 See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., (&% U.S. $'', $'% (!*&&) (“Displacement will 
occur only where . . . a signi,cant con+ict exists between an identi,able federal policy or interest 
and the [operation] of state law.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
United States v. Yazell, )&" U.S. )(!, )$" (!*##). 
139 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, )'( U.S. #(, %" n." (!*)&); see also Agency Holding Corp. v. 
Malley-Du- & Assocs., Inc., (&) U.S. !(), !#" (!*&%) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(quoting Hawkins v. Barney’s Lessee, )' U.S. ($ Pet.) ($%, (#( (!&)!)). 
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whether to fashion a uniform rule or incorporate state law as the federal rule 
of decision, it would have to take into account two competing principles: (!) 
the federal interest in the uniformity of federal law; and (") the federal140 
and state interest in having a state rule govern (i.e., federalism concerns). 
Since Congress cannot specify how it would resolve this tension with regard 
to every possible state rule that could conflict with its statute, it promulgated 
the RDA. To determine whether Congress’s statute “requires” a uniform 
judge-made rule on any given issue, the Court must pick up on certain clues 
as to how Congress would have decided the issue. 
The ,rst step in answering the question is to consider whether “a signi!-
cant con"ict exists between an identi,able federal policy or interest and the 
[operation] of state law.”141 To determine whether a signi,cant con+ict 
exists, the Court must identify some kind of “clear and substantial” goal or 
policy of the federal legislation with which the state rule con+icts.142 Thus, 
the starting point of the RDA inquiry has two components: (!) identifying a 
pertinent federal policy; and (") determining if the state law is in con+ict 
with that policy.143 
Under the proper RDA theory of federal common law making, the more 
clear and substantial this federal policy and the more signi,cant the con+ict 
between the state rule and federal policy, the more likely the statute 
requires that something other than state law apply. By the same token, if 
there is no clear and substantial federal policy and/or there is no signi,cant 
con+ict, the statute does not require that something other than state law 
apply. 
To ,nd the federal policy, the Court looks to Congress’s general intent 
in the relevant statute.144 The federal policy is more “clear” (and potentially 
 
140 See infra note !$# and accompanying text (discussing the nature of the federal interest in 
vertical uniformity of the law). 
141 Boyle, (&% U.S. at $'% (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Robertson, ()# U.S. at $*& (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Wallis v. Pan Am. 
Petroleum Corp., )&( U.S. #), #* (!*##) (“If there is a federal statute dealing with the general 
subject, it is a prime repository of federal policy and a starting point for federal common law.”); 
Hoosier Cardinal, )&) U.S. at %'* (White, J., dissenting).  
142 Yazell, )&" U.S. at )$"; cf. O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., $!" U.S. %*, 
&* (!**(); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Gonzales, )$# U.S. #!%, #"! (!*$&) (declining to hold federal 
legislation as preempting state law when the policy of the federal legislation was only in “remote” 
con+ict with the state law). 
143 See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., ((' U.S. %!$, %"& (!*%*) (“[W]e must . . . de-
termine whether application of state law would frustrate speci,c objectives of the federal 
programs.”). 
144 See Wallis, )&( U.S. at #*; cf. Justin Plaskov, Comment, Geothermal’s Prior Appropriation 
Problem, &) U. COLO. L. REV. "$%, "** n.)') ("'!!) (“While it is most important to determine 
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more “substantial”) when it is readily identi,able in the legislative history 
of the statute.145 In addition, it is more “clear” (and potentially more 
“substantial”) when it has been clearly expressed by Congress in analogous 
statutes.146 This is especially true where the Court believes that, in promul-
gating the analogous statute, Congress weighed the same federal and state 
interests implicated in the statute in question.147 
If a “clear and substantial” federal policy exists, the inquiry turns to the 
level of con+ict between the state rule and the federal policy. If there is a 
con+ict (however small), then there is at least a small federal interest in a 
uniform judge-made rule. However, one must be careful not to put the cart 
before the horse. The analytically precise inquiry asks ,rst about the 
existence of a con+ict and then, from this con+ict, infers a federal interest in 
a uniform judge-made rule—not the other way around.148 
 
if Congress intended to override state law, where a statute is ambiguous as to that speci,c point, 
the general intent of the statute becomes signi,cant.”). 
If this discussion of federal policy sounds familiar, it is because it is similar to the test for 
whether the Court is creating common law or engaging in statutory interpretation under the 
narrow de,nition of common law. Under the narrow de,nition of common law, the Court is 
creating common law when it bases its decision on the general intent of a statute. See supra note %* 
and accompanying text. General intent is essentially another term for the policy behind a statute. 
See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., $"# U.S. )&', )*"-*) (!***); Jonathan P. Rich, Note, 
The Attorney–Client Privilege in Congressional Investigations, && COLUM. L. REV. !($, !$% (!*&&). 
Thus, one can view the Court’s inquiry about the general intent of a statute in reverse-Erie 
cases as part of this “signi,cant con+ict” inquiry. For examples in the reverse-Erie context where 
the Court found a state rule con+icted with the general intent of a statute, see supra notes &!-&* 
and accompanying text.  
145 See Burks v. Lasker, ((! U.S. (%!, (&'-&$ (!*%*) (quoting from the legislative history of a 
statute to support a ,nding that the federal policy is “clear”). 
146 See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., $'' U.S. *', *& (!**!) (“Our cases indicate that a 
court should endeavor to ,ll the interstices of federal remedial schemes with uniform federal 
rules . . . when express provisions in analogous statutory schemes embody congressional policy 
choices readily applicable to the matter at hand.”); cf. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, ((( U.S. 
(*', (*$ (!*&') (declining to consider attorney’s fees in a calculation of damages in a FELA action 
where FELA was silent on the matter but similar federal statutes explicitly provided for compen-
sation of attorney’s fees). 
147 See DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, (#" U.S. !$!, !#* (!*&)) (“[W]e have available 
a federal statute of limitations actually designed to accommodate a balance of interests very similar 
to that at stake here—a statute that is, in fact, an analogy to the present lawsuit more apt than any 
of the suggested state-law parallels.”). 
148 Cf. Atherton v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., $!* U.S. "!), ""' (!**%) (“To invoke the concept 
of ‘uniformity,’ however, is not to prove its need.”); O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. 
Corp., $!" U.S. %*, && (!**() (“What is fatal to respondent’s position in the present case is that it 
has identi,ed no signi,cant con+ict with an identi,able federal policy or interest. . . . Uniformity 
of law might facilitate the FDIC’s nationwide litigation of these suits, eliminating state-by-state 
research and reducing uncertainty—but if the avoidance of those ordinary consequences quali,ed 
as an identi,able federal interest, we would be awash in ‘federal common-law’ rules.”).  
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And a simple con+ict is not enough—the con+ict must be “signi,cant.” 
The more signi,cant the con+ict, the more likely the Court’s inference that 
the statute requires a uniform judge-made rule. There will not be a “signi,-
cant” con+ict when the state law can coexist with minimal disruption to the 
federal policy or properly e-ectuate the federal policy.149 
But the Court has been hesitant to ,nd that a statute has “required” a 
uniform judge-made rule even when there is a “signi,cant con+ict” with a 
“clear and substantial” federal policy and, thus, a strong need for a uniform 
judge-made rule; such a ,nding is a necessary but not su.cient condition.150 
The federal policy–con+ict inquiry is only the ,rst part of the analysis. 
The second part of the analysis consists of a variety of federalism inquiries 
the Court looks to for clues as to whether the statute does not require that 
something other than state law apply even in the face of a signi,cant 
con+ict with a clear and substantial federal policy. 
First, the statute is less likely to have “required” a uniform judge-made 
rule where there is a strong state interest in using the state rule. The state 
interest is particularly strong in areas of law that are traditionally reserved 
to the states.151 
 
149 See Wallis, )&( U.S. at #*-%' (declining to create federal common law where state law was 
su.cient to carry out the federal policy of promoting the assignability of mineral leases); id. at %! 
(“Apart from the highly abstract nature of this [federal] interest, there has been no showing that 
state law is not adequate to achieve it.”). 
150 This is likely because the concept of the general intent behind a statute is so nebulous. 
Determining the general intent of a statute is a di.cult and imprecise task because, by its 
de,nition, the enacting Congress did not precisely lay out the general intent. See Wyeth v. 
Levine, $$$ U.S. $$$, $&) ("''*) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (expressing doubts as 
to the constitutionality of preempting state laws based on “generalized notions of congressional 
purposes that are not embodied within the text of federal law”). 
Nevertheless, the Court must play some role in e-ectuating the general intent of Congress. 
The Court is in a better institutional position than Congress to carry into e-ect the general intent 
of Congress on a day-to-day basis. Cf. Lemos, supra note !'(, at ($) (“[A]gencies are better able 
than Congress to adapt rules to respond to new information or changed circumstances.”). 
Moreover, Congress cannot expressly provide uniform rules whenever a new state rule be-
comes inconsistent with the general intent of its statute. Cf. Mistretta v. United States, (&& U.S. 
)#!, )%" (!*&*) (noting that, in an “increasingly complex society,” Congress must sometimes 
delegate its power in order to e-ect its will). 
151 See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, ($! U.S. )'(, )!# (!*&!) (“[T]he historic police powers 
of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Yazell, 
)&" U.S. )(!, )$" (!*##) (noting that the Court will create federal family common law instead of 
using state family law only where a federal policy will “su-er major damage”); De Sylva v. 
Ballentine, )$! U.S. $%', $&' (!*$#) (observing that family law is traditionally a “matter of state 
concern” and should generally supply the federal rule of decision). 
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Second, as the Court has noted on occasion, “Congress acts . . . against 
the background of the total corpus juris of the states.”152 This implies that the 
statute is less likely to have required a uniform judge-made rule where the 
state rule occupies a well-developed area of state law.153 
Third, Congress is in a better institutional position to legislate than the 
Court.154 Thus, the statute is less likely to have required a uniform judge-
made rule where the question of fashioning common law touches on a host 
of policy considerations (which legislatures are in a more legitimate position 
to weigh than courts).155 
Finally, the Court has been hesitant to ,nd that the statute required a 
uniform judge-made rule where state citizens have predicated their com-
mercial relationships on state law.156 This concern ostensibly carries more 
weight in the Court’s determination about Congress’s intent where the state 
law has been in place for a long period of time. 
Thus, cases where the Court declined to create a uniform judge-made 
rule157 can be seen as situations where the federal policy (i.e., general intent 
of Congress) was not “clear and substantial” enough to overcome the 
federalism-based indicators noted above. In such cases, Congress likely did 
 
152 Atherton, $!* U.S. at "!& (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
153 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, ()' U.S. (#", (%* (!*%%) (declining to create federal 
corporate common law since state corporate law was ,rmly established). 
154 Cf. Wallis, )&( U.S. at #& (“Whether latent federal power should be exercised to displace 
state law is primarily a decision for Congress.”). 
155 See O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., $!" U.S. %*, &* (!**() (“Within the 
federal system, at least, we have decided that that function of weighing and appraising [policy 
considerations] is more appropriately for those who write the laws, rather than for those who 
interpret them.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
156 See Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, ((" U.S. #$), #%( (!*%*) (“Private landowners rely on 
state real property law when purchasing real property . . . . There is considerable merit in not having 
the reasonable expectations of these private landowners upset by the vagaries of being located 
adjacent to or across from Indian reservations or other property in which the United States has a 
substantial interest.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., ((' U.S. %!$, %"&-
"* (!*%*) (“Finally, our choice-of-law inquiry must consider the extent to which application of a 
federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law.” (emphasis added)); Santa 
Fe, ()' U.S. at (%* (“Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to 
corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain 
responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal a-airs 
of the corporation.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
One might initially consider this factor a part of the inquiry that asks whether the state interest 
in using its rule is strong. However, the hesitancy to disrupt commercial relationships predicated 
on state law is, at its heart, a discrete federal interest. See Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the 
Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, !'# COLUM. L. REV. !*"(, !*(* ("''#) 
(recognizing that the interest in vertical uniformity of the law is a federal interest); Catherine T. 
Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uniformity, and As-Applied Challenges Under the Rules 
Enabling Act, &# NOTRE DAME L. REV. !!&!, !""* ("'!!) (same). 
157 See, e.g., supra note (". 
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not intend its statute to “require” the creation of a uniform judge-made 
rule. While none of the factors noted above are individually dispositive,158 
they contribute to an overall ,nding that the statute did not “require” the 
creation of a uniform judge-made rule.  
Viewed in this light, the Court’s determination of Congress’s intent is 
based on a sliding scale of factors. If the federal policy is more clear or 
substantial, or the con+ict between the policy and a state rule is more 
signi,cant, the Court will give less weight to the federalism factors identi-
,ed above. If the federal policy is less clear or substantial, or the con+ict 
between the policy and a state rule is less signi,cant, the federalism factors 
will be accorded more weight. 
It is also worth noting that, after the Court’s analysis, Congress always 
has the option of overruling the Court. Congress can tell the Supreme 
Court that it came to an incorrect determination in ,nding that a statute 
required the creation of federal common law by abrogating the common 
law.159 
). Evaluating the Court’s Reverse-Erie Cases Against the Correct  
RDA Theory of Federal Common Law Making 
The methodology that the Court uses in its reverse-Erie cases does not 
explicitly follow the inquiry for the creation of federal common law out-
lined in subsection III.C.". The simple explanation for this is that the Court 
has not recognized that a reverse-Erie case is a decision about whether or 
not to create federal common law, rather than a variant of the Erie problem. 
Nonetheless, the Court’s reverse-Erie jurisprudence can ,t into the frame-
work for the creation of federal common law outlined above. 
As to the ,rst part of the federal common law analysis, the Court con-
siders whether there is a signi,cant con+ict between a state rule and a clear 
 
158 Cf. Santa Fe, ()' U.S. at (%* (noting that the mere existence of a parallel state law remedy 
does not prohibit the Court from creating a federal common law remedy). 
159 See Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., ($! U.S. %%, *$ (!*&!) (“[W]e 
consistently have emphasized that the federal lawmaking power is vested in the legislative, not the 
judicial, branch of government; therefore, federal common law is subject to the paramount 
authority of Congress.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Sergio J. Campos, Erie 
as a Choice of Enforcement Defaults, #( FLA. L. REV. !$%), !$*) ("'!") (noting that Congress can 
always abrogate common law through legislation); Westen & Lehman, supra note %&, at ))* 
(suggesting the Act of State Doctrine as an example of Congress abrogating a common law rule 
fashioned by the Court); cf. id. at )(' (“When the federal courts . . . misperceive the law as 
implicitly expressed through the enactments . . . of the legislature . . . the law they make can be 
said to be invalid.”). 
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and substantial federal policy in its reverse-Erie cases. The Court has been 
faithful to this part of the analysis. 
In Brown, the Court implicitly identi,ed the general intent of Congress 
in FELA as the promotion of victim compensation.160 It found, as it does in 
the federal common law context,161 that the state rule could not coexist with 
the federal policy without disrupting it and, thus, that there was a signi,-
cant con+ict between the state rule and Congress’s general intent.162 
In Dice, the Court found that the right to a jury trial in the federal sys-
tem of jurisprudence, with which the state rule con+icted, was so funda-
mental that Congress drafted FELA with it in mind—that is to say, its 
continued vitality was part of Congress’s general intent in the statute.163 
The Court found the general intent of the jury requirement in the values 
animating the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution,164 just as the Court 
,nds the general intent of Congress in analogous statutes in the federal 
common law setting. Even though the analogous document in Dice was the 
Constitution, the general principle applies—looking to a document other 
than the statute itself can illuminate Congress’s intent.165 
In Felder, the Court found that the state rule con+icted with the general 
intent of Congress in § !*&) related to victim’s compensation.166 Finally, in 
Johnson, the Court declined to fashion a uniform judge-made rule and 
instead used the state rule because it found no general intent of Congress in 
§ !*&) about interlocutory appeals.167 Again, it reached this determination 
by looking to analogous statutes,168 just as the Court does in the federal 
common law context. 
 
160 See supra note &! and accompanying text. 
161 See supra note !(* and accompanying text. 
162 See Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., ))& U.S. "*(, "*&-** (!*(*) (holding that using the state 
rule would lead to federal rights in FELA being “defeated under the name of local practice” 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
163 See supra notes &"-&$ and accompanying text. 
       164 See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., )(" U.S. )$*, )#) (!*$") (“The right 
to trial by jury is a basic and fundamental feature of our system of federal jurisprudence.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citing Bailey v. Cent. Vt. Ry., Inc., )!* U.S. )$', )$( (!*()))). Bailey, 
in turn, cited an earlier case, Jacob v. New York City, )!$ U.S. %$", %$" (!*("), which added that the 
jury right stemmed from the Seventh Amendment.  
        Although the Seventh Amendment does not apply to the states, the Court in Dice recognized 
that Congress drafted FELA with the expectation that the value of having a trial by jury, expressed 
in the Seventh Amendment, should be protected. 
165 See supra note !(# and accompanying text. 
166 See supra notes &&-&* and accompanying text. 
167 See supra notes %!-%) and accompanying text. 
168 See Johnson v. Fankell, $"' U.S. *!!, *"! n.!" (!**%) (noting that the expression of con-
gressional intent with respect to interlocutory appeals is found in § !"*! rather than in § !*&)). 
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As to the second part of the federal common law analysis, the Court has 
been far less on-point in its reverse-Erie cases. The Court has engaged in 
only one of the relevant federalism inquiries—whether a state rule occupies 
an area of law that is traditionally reserved to the states.169  
In the “procedural” arena (where reverse-Erie cases lie), the area of law 
that is traditionally reserved to the states involves transsubstantive proce-
dural rules.170 The federalism concerns implicated by Congress requiring 
that a state court use a uniform judge-made rule, rather than a transsubstan-
tive state rule, are signi,cant.171 Such a decision by Congress would displace 
a component of the underlying state judicial system.  
 This concern is absent when Congress requires that a state court use a 
uniform judge-made rule rather than a substance-speci!c172 state rule.173 A 
state has a great interest in creating a body of transsubstantive procedural 
rules and then applying them in its own courts. This interest is far greater 
than the state’s similar interest with respect to narrow substance-speci,c 
procedural rules, an area of law not traditionally reserved to the states. 
 Thus, one can view the Court’s inquiry into whether the state rule is of 
general applicability (i.e., transsubstantive) or narrow applicability (i.e., 
substance-speci,c) in its reverse-Erie cases as part of this larger inquiry 
regarding areas of law traditionally reserved to the states.  
Justice Frankfurter was the ,rst member of the Court to engage in the 
transsubstantive–substance-speci,c inquiry by intimating a distinction in 
 
169 See supra note !$! and accompanying text. 
170 See supra note $# (providing a de,nition of transsubstantive “procedural” rules). 
171 Transsubstantive federal “procedural” rules do not apply in state courts hearing federal 
causes of action. Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” "''* WIS. L. 
REV. $)$, $$& n.!'". However, Congress can, and does, override state “procedural” rules with 
federal substance-speci,c “procedural” rules since any substance-speci,c common law established 
by the U.S. Supreme Court derived from a federal statute binds state court judges. See supra note 
!". Additionally, in cases where common law does not already exist, a state court hearing a federal 
cause of action must create substance-speci,c common law and thus decline to use a state rule 
when it believes the U.S. Supreme Court would do so. See supra note !"*. In these two ways, 
Congress can indirectly require that a state court use a uniform judge-made “procedural” rule 
rather than a state rule. 
172 Substance-speci,c “procedural” rules are rules that apply only to cases in a certain sub-
stantive area. A state notice-of-claim requirement for all civil actions against state governmental 
o.cials is an example of a substance-speci,c rule. 
173 Cf. Felder v. Casey, (&% U.S. !)!, !($ (!*&&) (“We . . . cannot accept the suggestion that 
this requirement is simply part of the vast body of procedural rules, rooted in policies unrelated to 
the de,nition of any particular substantive cause of action, that forms no essential part of the 
cause of action as applied to any given plainti-.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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his dissent in Dice.174 The Court then fully adopted this inquiry in Felder175 
and rea.rmed it later in Johnson.176 
Beyond asking whether the state rule occupies an area of law traditionally 
reserved to the states, the Court does not engage in any of the other federal 
common law making inquiries outlined in subsection III.C.". Instead, the 
Court mistakenly uses three other tests to decide reverse-Erie cases: (!) a 
substance-speci,c state rule discrimination test; (") a procedural–
substantive distinction; and ()) an outcome-determination test. 
The Court ,rst used the substance-speci,c state rule discrimination test 
in Felder by inquiring as to whether a substance-speci,c state rule discrimi-
nated177 against a federal right.178 It continued this error in Johnson.179 This 
 
174 See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., )(" U.S. )$*, )#& (!*$") (Frankfur-
ter, J., concurring for reversal but dissenting from the Court’s opinion) (“Ohio and her sister 
States with a similar division of functions between law and equity are not trying to evade their 
duty under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act; nor are they trying to make it more di.cult for 
railroad workers to recover, than for those suing under local law.”). 
Interestingly, Justice Frankfurter, apparently without realizing it, used the language of the 
RDA in ,nding that the Court should use the state rule rather than create federal common law.  
[C]ertainly the Employers’ Liability Act does not require a State to have juries for 
negligence actions brought under the Federal Act in its courts. Or, if a State chooses 
to retain the old double system of courts, common law and equity—as did a good 
many States until the other day, and as four States still do—surely there is nothing in 
the Employers’ Liability Act that requires traditional distribution of authority for dis-
posing of legal issues as between common law and chancery courts to go by the 
board. . . . Nothing in the Employers’ Liability Act or in the judicial enforcement of 
the Act for over forty years forces such judicial hybridization upon the States.  
Id. at )#%-#& (emphasis added). Justice Frankfurter’s dissent recognizes that there is no basis for 
creating common law because Congress, through the statute in question (FELA), did not require 
the creation of a uniform judge-made rule. Even though Justice Frankfurter does not explicitly 
reference the RDA, this is a perfect example of the long-held view that the RDA is “no more than 
a declaration of what the law would have been without it.” Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, )'( U.S. 
#(, %" n." (!*)&); cf. supra notes !)$-!)* and accompanying text (arguing that the Court’s federal 
common law cases that do not reference the RDA can serve as implicit interpretations of it). 
The Court in Erie appears to be referring to a federal common law rule, animated by federalism 
concerns, which would prescribe the same rule as the RDA. It is important to note that this 
principle noted in Erie is not mandated by the Tenth Amendment because reverse-Erie cases occur 
in areas where Congress has independent constitutional law making power. See supra notes **-!'' 
and accompanying text. Therefore, this principle in Erie does not undermine the argument that 
reverse-Erie cases are not truly preemption cases. See supra notes !'!-') and accompanying text. 
175 See supra note !%).  
176 See Johnson v. Fankell, $"' U.S. *!!, *!& (!**%) (,nding that the state rule was “a neutral 
state Rule regarding the administration of the state courts”); id. at *!* (“The States . . . have great 
latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts.” (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
177 The Court and this Comment use the term “discrimination” to refer to a state rule that 
applies only to the type of claim that the federal statute in question authorizes. See Felder, (&% 
U.S. at !(!-(" (“[T]he notice provision discriminates against the federal right. While the State 
 
  
 !"*" University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. !#": !"#! 
 
inquiry is not a component of the ,rst part of federal common law analysis. 
Whether a state rule discriminates against a federal right has no bearing on 
whether it signi,cantly con+icts with a “clear and substantial” federal 
policy. A state rule that applies broadly to a wide range of causes of action 
can easily con+ict signi,cantly with a “clear and substantial” federal policy 
and vice versa. 
Under the second part of the federal common law analysis, as this 
Comment notes, substance-speci,c state rules, like the rule in Felder, do not 
occupy an area of law traditionally reserved to the states.180 And the Court 
has not used this substance-speci,c inquiry in the normal federal common 
law making context in order to determine whether a statute required the 
Court to fashion a uniform judge-made rule. 
The Court also mistakenly engages in an inquiry about whether the fed-
eral or state rule is one of “procedure” or “substance” to determine whether 
to follow the state rule.181 The Court often applies this test by stating that it 
is well-settled that a rule is either “substantive” or “procedural.”182 Under 
the Court’s view, the state interest in having state procedural laws govern 
categorically outweighs the federal interest in a uniform judge-made 
procedural rule and vice versa.  
 Under an RDA approach, one might argue that this inquiry could be 
relevant as a proxy for congressional intent. Under this view, the Court 
would always presume that Congress’s statute did not require that some-
thing other than state procedural rules apply and that Congress’s statute did 
require that something other than state substantive rules apply. Under this 
 
a-ords the victim of an intentional tort two years to recognize the compensable nature of his or 
her injury, the civil rights victim is given only four months to appreciate that he or she has been 
deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right.”). 
178 See id. at !(# (“Here, the notice-of-claim provision most emphatically does discriminate 
in a manner detrimental to the federal right: only those persons who wish to sue governmental 
defendants are required to provide notice within such an abbreviated time period.”). But see id. at 
!#' (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the state rule “applies to all actions against municipal 
defendants, whether brought under state or federal law” and thus is not discriminatory). 
179 See Johnson, $"' U.S. at *!& n.* (“Unlike the notice-of-claim rule at issue in [Felder], [the 
state rule] does not target civil rights claims against the State.”). 
180 The exception to this proposition is in areas of unique state interest, such as family law 
and corporate law. 
181 See St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Dickerson, (%' U.S. ('*, (!! (!*&$) (“FELA cases adjudicated 
in state courts are subject to state procedural rules, but the substantive law governing them is 
federal.”); Cent. Vt. Ry. Co. v. White, ")& U.S. $'%, $!!-!" (!*!$) (“As long as the question 
involves a mere matter of procedure . . . the state court can . . . follow their own practice even in 
the trial of suits arising under the Federal law.”).  
182 See St. Louis, (%' U.S. at (!! (“[I]t is settled that the propriety of jury instructions con-
cerning the measure of damages in an FELA action is an issue of ‘substance’ determined by 
federal law.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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view, Congress would have made this determination based on federalism 
concerns.  
Other than the glaring initial issue that Congress could easily have in-
cluded the procedural–substantive language in the RDA if it so chose,183 
there are fundamental problems with engaging in this inquiry. Procedure 
and substance alone are not good proxies for federalism concerns,184 and 
reducing complex congressional policymaking to such simplistic labels 
(absent congressional instruction to do so)185 risks undermining the values 
of federalism safeguarded by the RDA federal common law making analysis 
outlined above.  
A procedural state rule can signi,cantly con+ict with a “clear and sub-
stantial” federal policy just as a substantive state rule may signi,cantly 
con+ict with a federal policy. It is better to conduct the federal common law 
making analysis that this Comment outlines because that analysis focuses on 
congressional intent in a federal statute and the very federalism concerns 
judges express when they use the substance and procedure labels. 
Moreover, labels like “procedure” and “substance” are easily capable of 
manipulation by hostile state court judges,186 or, at the very least, are 
de,ned di-erently by di-erent judges. As the Court has stated on many 
occasions in the context of Erie cases, it helps to think about procedure–
substance labels only in reference to the underlying goals of classifying a 
rule as one or the other.187 However, unlike in the Erie context, the Court 
 
183 The Rules Enabling Act is evidence that Congress, when it desires to make the applica-
tion of federal or state law depend on a distinction between substance and procedure, knows how 
to do so. See "& U.S.C. § "'%"(a)–(b) ("'!") (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to 
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure . . . for cases in the United States district 
courts . . . . Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” (emphasis 
added)). 
184 See Peter Raven-Hansen, Regulatory Estoppel: When Agencies Break Their Own “Laws,” #( 
TEX. L. REV. !, #) (!*&$) (“The substance versus procedure test arguably undermines rather than 
advances the values of federalism by deprecating deliberate . . . legislative policy based on this 
idea . . . .”); Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, !'' YALE L.J. !*)$, !*(! (!**!) (“[T]he 
appropriate allocation of authority in a federal union cannot be made by reference to the 
substance–procedure distinction. To the extent that respect for state autonomy is important to 
preserve through federal judicial conformity with state law, that autonomy is just as easily 
undermined by independent federal procedure as it is by independent federal substantive law.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
185 See supra note !&) (noting that Congress, in the Rules Enabling Act, demonstrated that it 
has the ability to prescribe rulemaking based on distinctions between “procedure” and “substance” 
when it so chooses). 
186 See infra notes "!%-!* and accompanying text (discussing the concern that state judges 
may improperly narrow the breadth of federal rights). 
187 See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, )"# U.S. **, !'& (!*($) (“Matters of ‘substance’ and 
matters of ‘procedure’ are much talked about in the books as though they de,ned a great divide 
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has never made a similar cautionary statement about state court judges 
using procedure and substance labels in the reverse-Erie context as a 
substitute for a meaningful analysis of congressional intent regarding the 
creation of common law. 
The likely reason for the Court’s use of this procedure–substance test is 
that the term “reverse-Erie” in+uences the Court to apply the principles of 
Erie188 to a situation that is merely a decision about whether or not to create 
federal common law.189  
Finally, the Court has also used an outcome-determination test to de-
cide whether it should follow a state rule or create common law in its 
reverse-Erie cases. While the Court did not reference the test in either 
Brown or Dice, it adopted the test in Felder190 and used it again in Johnson.191  
However, under the federal common law making analysis outlined 
above, the Court has recognized that a state statute being outcome-
determinative does not make it inconsistent with a federal statute.192 The 
use of the outcome-determination test in the reverse-Erie context is a poor 
substitute for the real con+ict analysis required when making federal 
common law. Thus, the Court should decline to use this outcome-
determination test in the reverse-Erie context.  
 
cutting across the whole domain of law. But, of course, ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ are the same 
key-words to very di-erent problems. Neither ‘substance’ nor ‘procedure’ represents the same 
invariants. Each implies di-erent variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is 
used.”). 
188 See Hanna v. Plumer, )&' U.S. (#', (#(-## (!*#$) (applying the procedure–substance 
test as part of the Erie doctrine). 
189 Cf. Michael Steven Green, The Twin Aims of Erie, && NOTRE DAME L. REV. !&#$, !*'*-
!% ("'!)) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s reverse-Erie jurisprudence is in+uenced by the 
Court’s implicit and incorrect view that the twin aims of Erie should guide state courts facing 
reverse-Erie problems). Following the Supreme Court’s mistaken lead, both state courts and 
scholars frequently implicate the concerns of the Erie doctrine when discussing the reverse-Erie 
problem. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpreta-
tion, %* U. CHI. L. REV. !"!$, !"%"-%) ("'!") (arguing against freedom for state court judges in 
interpreting federal law in reverse-Erie cases because it would implicate Erie’s concerns about 
disuniformity of the law and forum shopping). 
190 See Felder v. Casey, (&% U.S. !)!, !)& (!*&&) (“[B]ecause its enforcement in such actions 
will frequently and predictably produce di-erent outcomes in § !*&) litigation based solely on 
whether the claim is asserted in state or federal court, we conclude that the state law is pre-empted 
when the § !*&) action is brought in a state court.”). 
191 See Johnson v. Fankell, $"' U.S. *!!, *!&-"' (!**%) (,nding a state rule regarding inter-
locutory appeals not to be outcome-determinative because a party could have the subject of the 
interlocutory appeal reviewed at the conclusion of the trial). 
192 See Burks v. Lasker, ((! U.S. (%!, (%* (!*%*) (“[A] state statute cannot be considered 
‘inconsistent’ with federal law merely because the statute causes the plainti- to lose the litiga-
tion . . . .” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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As noted earlier, the outcome-determination test is relevant in the 
standard federal common law making context (and, by extension, the 
reverse-Erie context) only in evaluating whether the RDA applies.193 Again, 
the likely reason for the Court’s use of this outcome-determination test is 
that it is in+uenced by the term “reverse-Erie” to apply the principles of 
Erie194 to a mere federal common law making decision. As Justice O’Connor 
noted in her dissent from the Court’s decision in Felder, the use of the 
outcome-determination test is “based on a sort of upside-down theory of 
federalism, which the Court attributes to Congress on the basis of no 
evidence at all.”195 
Under the RDA approach that this Comment advocates, Congress has 
expressed how its wishes to treat reverse-Erie problems. Congress com-
mands the Court to use state law unless a federal statute otherwise “re-
quires.” And the Court should determine whether a federal statute 
otherwise requires by conducting the federal common law making analysis 
outlined above and not through the outcome-determination test. 
IV. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR STATE COURTS  
FACING REVERSE-ERIE PROBLEMS 
This Part lays out an analytical framework for state courts to use when 
tackling reverse-Erie problems in the fourth and ,fth categories—where an 
inferior federal court has fashioned or endorsed federal common law or 
where a state rule con+icts with the interests inherent in a federal statute 
(i.e., the creation of federal common law may be justi,ed where it does not 
already exist). This Part then evaluates current state court practice against 
this framework. 
A. Where an Inferior Federal Court Has Established  
Federal Common Law 
Federal common law can be developed by three federal bodies—the 
U.S. Supreme Court, a U.S. court of appeals, and a U.S. district court. A 
state court is bound to apply pertinent federal common law fashioned or 
endorsed by the Supreme Court because the Court theoretically acts only 
 
193 See supra notes !")-"( and accompanying text (equating the terms “rule of decision” and 
“outcome-determinative” to note that the RDA only applies in cases where the state rule in 
question is outcome-determinative). 
194 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, )"# U.S. **, !'* (!*($) (formulating the outcome-
determination test as an evolution of the Erie doctrine). 
195 Felder v. Casey, (&% U.S. !)!, !#! (!*&&) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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within its statutory limits (i.e., the RDA) when fashioning a rule of com-
mon law.196 
The more interesting case arises where a federal court of appeals has 
established or endorsed pertinent federal common law. The following 
hypothetical case is an illustration of a situation in which a state court 
would be confronted with “pertinent” federal common law established by a 
federal court of appeals. A federal court of appeals hears a case brought 
under federal statute XYZ in which the defendant argues for the application 
of state A’s notice-of-claim provision, and the plainti- argues that the 
application of state A’s notice-of-claim provision would thwart the remedial 
goals of federal statute XYZ. The federal court of appeals rules in favor of 
the plainti-, and state A’s notice-of-claims provision is held not to apply to 
cases brought under federal statute XYZ. 
 In a subsequent unrelated case, a plainti- brings an action in a court of 
state A under federal statute XYZ (which does not vest exclusive jurisdic-
tion in the federal courts).197 As in the prior case, the defendant argues for 
the application of state A’s notice-of-claim provision, and the plainti- 
argues that that the application of state A’s notice-of-claim provision would 
thwart the remedial goals of federal statute XYZ.  
 The court of state A is not bound to accept the federal court of appeals’ 
determination that the state notice-of-claim provision thwarts the remedial 
goals of federal statute XYZ.198 However, the federal court of appeals 
considered precisely the same question with which the court of state A is 
now faced. It is in this sense that the federal common law fashioned by the 
federal court of appeals is “pertinent.” 
Another example is the Seventh Circuit’s decision in what eventually 
became the U.S. Supreme Court case Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, 
Inc.199 In Kamen, the Seventh Circuit determined that the demand require-
ment for a stockholder derivative suit that was ,led under the Investment 
Company Act of !*(' (ICA), a federal statute, should be determined in 
reference to federal law.200 Declining to incorporate Maryland state law as 
the federal rule of decision, the Seventh Circuit fashioned a uniform judge-
made rule that the futility of making a demand is not a valid excuse for 
failure to make a demand.201  
 
196 See supra note !" and accompanying text. 
197 See supra note " and accompanying text. 
198 See infra note "') and accompanying text. 
199 $'' U.S. *' (!**!) 
200 *'& F."d !))&, !)(" (%th Cir. !**'). 
201 Id. at !)(%. 
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If the Supreme Court had not granted the petition for writ of certiorari 
in Kamen, the uniform judge-made rule that the Seventh Circuit had 
adopted would have stood. Any future stockholder derivative action under 
the ICA ,led in Maryland state court would have presented the Maryland 
state court with the precise question that the Seventh Circuit faced; namely, 
whether the ICA “requires” a uniform judge-made rule de,ning a demand 
requirement or whether the federal rule of decision for a demand require-
ment can incorporate Maryland state law.202 It is in this sense that the 
Seventh Circuit’s holding in Kamen would have been “pertinent” to such a 
case in Maryland state court. 
As an initial matter, it is important to note that scholars agree that state 
courts, being coordinate rather than inferior to federal courts, are not 
constitutionally bound to follow federal common law fashioned or endorsed 
by a federal court of appeals.203 This rule does not, however, preclude a 
state court from treating a federal court’s interpretation of federal law as 
persuasive.204 As a normative matter, state courts should accord pertinent 
federal common law fashioned or endorsed by a federal court of appeals a 
presumption of correctness and refuse to follow the common law only 
where they believe the creation of the common law was clearly erroneous. 
There is a federal interest in uniformity looming over all reverse-Erie 
questions. Even if a state court would decide not to fashion common law 
after conducting the same analysis as a federal court of appeals, once the 
federal common law is established by a federal court of appeals and has been 
applied by federal courts, the federal interest in uniformity is much greater 
than it was before. In the case where no federal common law exists at all 
 
202 See !$ U.S.C. § &'a-() ("'!") (providing for concurrent state court jurisdiction for cases 
brought under the ICA). 
203 See Lockhart v. Fretwell, $'# U.S. )#(, )%# (!**)) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Su-
premacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law, but neither federal supremacy nor any 
other principle of federal law requires that a state court’s interpretation of federal law give way to 
a (lower) federal court’s interpretation.”); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey 
Superior Court Precedents?, (# STAN. L. REV. &!%, &"$ (!**() (noting that, pursuant to Article III, 
state courts are not constitutionally bound to follow the decision of an inferior federal court 
because the inferior federal courts exercise no appellate review over the decisions of state courts); 
Colin E. Wrabley, Applying Federal Court of Appeals’ Precedent: Contrasting Approaches to Applying 
Court of Appeals’ Federal Law Holdings and Erie State Law Predictions, ) SETON HALL CIRCUIT 
REV. !, !%-!* ("''#) (observing that twenty-nine states do not treat federal courts of appeals’ 
decisions on federal law as binding). But see Yniguez v. Arizona, *)* F."d %"%, %)# (*th Cir. !**!) 
(expressing doubts as to the “wisdom” of the view that state courts should not consider themselves 
bound by a decision of a federal court of appeals). 
204 See generally Hall v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, &$! A."d &$*, &#) (Pa. "''() (noting that 
a vast majority of state supreme courts view a decision of an inferior federal court as “persuasive, 
but not binding, authority”). 
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(i.e., the ,fth category of reverse-Erie), the state rule is con+icting only 
with potentially vague notions of general intent behind a statute;205 the 
federal interest in the uniformity of law is weaker here as it is examined 
only in reference to this con+ict.  
However, in the case where federal common law has been established by 
a federal court of appeals, the state rule con+icts with the general intent of 
Congress and existing federal common law, rendering the federal concern 
with disuniformity in the law more acute.206 Presumably, this disuniformity 
concern is even greater where the federal common law has been in place for 
a long time,207 the lower federal courts are in agreement,208 or the common 
law in question was developed or endorsed by the state court’s coordinate 
federal court of appeals.209 
The disuniformity concern becomes even more troubling when one con-
siders that the only mechanism for review of a state court’s decision refusing 
to recognize federal common law that was endorsed or created by a federal 
court of appeals (a federal–state “split” case) is U.S. Supreme Court 
certiorari review. Procedural requirements, such as the requirement that a 
case must ,rst reach the highest state court “in which a decision could be 
had,”210 prevent many of these cases from being reviewed by the Court.211 
 
205 See generally supra note !$'. 
206 Cf. Red Maple Props. v. Zoning Comm’n, #!' A."d !")&, !"(" n.% (Conn. !**") (“It 
would be a bizarre result if this court [adopted one standard] when in another courthouse, a few 
blocks away, the federal court, being bound by the Second Circuit rule, required [a di-erent 
standard]. We do not believe that . . . Congress . . . intended to create such a disparate treatment 
of plainti-s depending on their choice of a federal or state forum.” (citation and internal 
quotations marks omitted)); Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., ##" N.E."d )*%, (') (Ill. !**#) 
(noting that the interpretation of a federal statute by federal courts is binding on Illinois courts in 
order to give the statute uniform application). 
207 The longer the federal common law has existed in the federal court of appeals without 
being overruled by the Supreme Court or abrogated by Congress, see supra note !$*, the more 
likely that the federal court of appeals divined Congress’s intent correctly. Thus, the longer the 
federal common law has existed, the more presumptive validity it has, and the more weight the 
state court should give it. 
208 See State v. Riggs, $#& N.W."d !'!, !'# (Mich. Ct. App. !**%) (“Michigan adheres to the 
rule that a state court is bound by the authoritative holdings of federal courts regarding federal 
questions when there is no con+ict. . . . However, where an issue has divided the circuits of the 
federal court of appeals, this Court is free to choose the most appropriate view.”); Hall, &$! A."d 
at &#( (noting that Alabama, California, and Illinois treat the decisions of lower federal courts as 
binding where the decisions of those courts are “numerous and consistent”). 
209 Where the federal courts of appeals are split on an issue, the presumption of correctness 
is called into doubt and the state court should engage in the analysis proposed in Section IV.B. 
See, e.g., Axess Int’l, Ltd. v. Intercargo Ins. Co., )' P.)d !, %-& (Wash. Ct. App. "''!) (employing 
an independent analysis of whether to create federal common law where the Second Circuit and 
Eleventh Circuit were in disagreement about whether federal common law should exist). 
210 See supra note #. 
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This problem is compounded by the Court’s shrinking docket and reticence 
in taking cases from state supreme courts. 212  
Moreover, federal courts are experts on federal law213 and at divining 
Congress’s intent.214 They fashion federal common law and conduct inquiries 
as to congressional intent on a daily basis. This fact is especially relevant in 
the reverse-Erie context where a court must determine whether a state rule 
con+icts with the nebulous general intent of Congress in a federal statute.215 
The inquiry about whether a statute requires that something other than 
state law apply is a largely intent-driven inquiry.216 Presumably, state courts 
would be at a comparative disadvantage to federal courts in reaching an 
accurate answer to that question of congressional intent. 
Applying a presumption of correctness would also alleviate much of the 
concern that state judges are hostile to federal rights.217 This concern is 
 
211 See Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, (%& U.S. &'(, &"% n.# (!*&#) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“One might argue that this Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments 
in cases arising under federal law can be depended upon to correct erroneous state-court decisions 
and to insure that federal law is interpreted and applied uniformly. However, as any experienced 
observer of this Court can attest, Supreme Court review of state courts, limited by docket 
pressures, narrow review of the facts, the debilitating possibilities of delay, and the necessity of 
deferring to adequate state grounds of decision, cannot do the whole job.” (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
212 Cf. Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., """ F."d !&(, !&* ("d Cir. !*$$) (explaining that 
granting exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts to hear a cause of action leads to more uniform 
application of the law due to the Supreme Court’s limited docket); see generally Owens & Simon, 
supra note %, at !""$-#) (discussing the Court’s shrinking docket, possible reasons for it, and its 
implications). 
213 The Court has noted in the past that deciding a federal case in federal court brings “the 
desirability of uniform interpretation, the expertise of federal judges in federal law, and the 
assumed greater hospitality of federal courts to peculiarly federal claims.” Gulf O-shore Co. v. 
Mobil Oil Corp., ($) U.S. (%), (&)-&( (!*&!); see also Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue 
Eng’g & Mfg., $($ U.S. )'&, )!" ("''$); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, $!# U.S. )#%, )&) 
(!**#); AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND 
FEDERAL COURTS !#(-#$ (!*#&) (“The federal courts have acquired a considerable expertness in 
the interpretation and application of federal law which would be lost if federal questions were 
given to state courts.”); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A 
Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, )# UCLA L. REV. )"*, ))) (!*&&) 
(recognizing that federal courts have a greater institutional competence than state courts in 
developing federal law). 
214 See Merrell Dow, (%& U.S. at &"% (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he federal courts are com-
paratively more skilled at interpreting and applying federal law, and are much more likely 
correctly to divine Congress’ intent in enacting legislation.”). 
215 See generally supra note !$'. 
216 See supra note !(( and accompanying text. 
217 See THE FEDERALIST NO. &', at (%& (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., !*#!) 
(“The reasonableness of the agency of the national courts in cases in which the state tribunals 
cannot be supposed to be impartial speaks for itself.”); David P. Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected 
Defense, ($ U. CHI. L. REV. )!%, )"& (!*%&) (“[F]ederal question jurisdiction [is based] upon [a] 
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particularly acute in the reverse-Erie context because the concept of general 
intent is so nebulous. State judges can claim that Congress did not “require” 
a uniform judge-made rule in its statute without being unambiguously 
wrong. It is precisely this area on the boundary of the federal right (i.e., 
where the Court would look to the general intent of the statute) that a state 
court judge would be most hostile to “extending” a federal right. 
There is some evidence that Congress considers this hostility concern 
salient as well. Justice Brennan has attributed the hostility concern to 
Congress’s decision to vest federal courts with original jurisdiction over 
federal question cases in the ,rst instance.218 Scholars have also attributed 
this hostility concern to Congress’s promulgation of the federal statute that 
provides for Supreme Court review of state court decisions.219 
Finally, simply as a matter of comity, it is desirable to have state courts 
respect the decisions of federal courts on matters of federal law.220 As an 
interesting analogy, the clearly erroneous standard of review has long been 
invoked when comity is an important value of the reviewing court.221 For 
 
fear of state court hostility to or misunderstanding of federal rights.”); Ethan J. Leib, Localist 
Statutory Interpretation, !#! U. PA. L. REV. &*%, *"( ("'!)) (“[N]otwithstanding their oath to 
uphold the federal Constitution, state judges are generally allegiant to the state rather than the 
federal government in the “reverse-Erie” context.”); Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the 
District Courts, $) COLUM. L. REV. !$%, !$& (!*$)) (“Presumably judges selected and paid by the 
central government, with tenure during good behavior—and that determined by the Congress— 
and probably even somewhat insulated by a separate building, are more likely to give full scope to 
any given Supreme Court decision, and particularly ones unpopular locally, than are their state 
counterparts. By the same token, should a district judge fail, or err, a more sympathetic treatment 
of Supreme Court precedents can be expected from federal circuit judges than from state appellate 
courts.” (footnote omitted)). 
218 Merrell Dow, (%& U.S. at &"% n.# (Brennan, J., dissenting). Some commentators have also 
suggested that Congress has considered the general federal–state “split” problem as serious enough 
to warrant vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts for certain federal causes of action. 
See, e.g., Louis Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules and State Law, %) HARV. L. REV. !"(*, !"%$ (!*#') 
(suggesting the same with regards to the Securities Exchange Act of !*)(). 
219 See Mishkin, supra note "!%, at !$& n.!' (“The statutory provisions for review by the Su-
preme Court of state court decisions have always re+ected a fear that state judges might be prone 
to narrow unduly the scope of national power.”). 
220 See Little,eld v. State Dep’t of Human Servs., (&' A."d %)!, %)% (Me. !*&() (“[E]ven 
though only a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States is the supreme law of the land 
on a federal issue . . . in the interests of existing harmonious federal–state relationships, it is a wise 
policy that a state court of last resort accept, so far as reasonably possible, a decision of its federal 
circuit court on . . . a federal question.”). 
221 It is only an analogy because, in the cases that follow this proposition, the reviewing court 
had direct appellate jurisdiction over the court being reviewed and thus its decision bound the 
lower court. Cf. supra note "') and accompanying text (recognizing that state courts are not 
constitutionally bound to follow the decisions of inferior federal courts). This Comment argues 
that, only as a matter of sound policy, should state courts presume the correctness of the decisions of 
federal courts of appeals on matters of federal common law.  
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example, in Bonet v. Texas Co., the Court used a clear error standard in 
reviewing the decisions of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico on matters of 
local Puerto Rico law.222 
More recently, the Third Circuit has allowed the nascent Supreme 
Court of the Virgin Islands, over which it exercises certiorari review,223 to 
disregard Third Circuit case law interpreting local Virgin Islands law as 
long as the interpretation by the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands of its 
local law is not manifestly erroneous.224 The Third Circuit based its stand-
ard on the U.S. Supreme Court’s standard in Bonet.225 The Supreme Court 
noted that the standard of review in Bonet was premised on “the deference 
due [to] interpretations of local law by . . . local courts.”226 Stripped down 
to its essence, the standard used by the Court in Bonet is the product of 
Sovereign ! (the United States) deferring to the decisions of Sovereign " 
(Puerto Rico) on Sovereign "’s local matters when Sovereign ! is not 
compelled to defer.  
Similarly, in a reverse-Erie case, a state court (Sovereign !) would be 
deferring to the decisions of a federal court of appeals (Sovereign ") on 
matters of federal common law (Sovereign "’s local matters) by refusing to 
follow the decision only if it is clearly erroneous. As in Bonet, the state court 
is in a situation where it is not compelled to defer to federal law.227 
However, despite the foregoing reasons for applying a presumption of 
correctness to the decision of a federal court of appeals with respect to 
federal common law, it is important that the state court be able to ignore 
the decision if it ,nds that it is clearly erroneous. In such a situation, the 
state court would necessarily have to come to the conclusion that the U.S. 
Supreme Court would come out the opposite way from the federal court of 
 
222 )'& U.S. (#), (%! (!*('). 
223 See (& U.S.C. § !#!) ("''#) (establishing relations between the Third Circuit and the 
courts of the Virgin Islands). 
224 See Defoe v. Phillip, %'" F.)d %)$, %(( ()d Cir. "'!"). The “manifest error” standard is 
another term for the “clearly erroneous” standard; see also Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. 
Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, $'& U.S. #'", #$" (!**)) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (equating the terms “clear error” and “manifest error”); Bonet, )'& 
U.S. at (%! (“For to justify reversal in such cases, the error must be clear or manifest; the 
interpretation must be inescapably wrong; the decision must be patently erroneous.”). 
225 Defoe, %'" F.)d at %((. The First and Ninth Circuits have also used this standard of review 
in similar situations based on Bonet. See, e.g., Haeuser v. Dep’t of Law, )#& F.)d !'*!, !'** (*th 
Cir. "''() (using a manifest error standard of review in reviewing the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Guam on matters of local law); C. Brewer P.R., Inc. v. Corchado, )') F."d #$(, #$( (!st 
Cir. !*#") (using a manifest error standard of review in reviewing the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Puerto Rico on matters of local law). 
226 Bonet, )'& U.S. at (%'. 
227 See supra note "') and accompanying text. 
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appeals. Since clear error is such a demanding standard, the state court 
would have to be almost certain that the Supreme Court would come out the 
opposite way. This near certainty would tip the scale and invoke the state 
court’s duty to decide the way it believes the Supreme Court would,228 
overcoming the presumption of correctness accorded to the federal court of 
appeals. 
Although state courts should presume correctness when it comes to the 
federal court of appeals, federal common law established by a federal 
district court should not be given the same presumption of correctness by a 
state court.229 A similar presumption runs the risk of introducing disuniformity 
into the law—a result antithetical to the goal of the federal legislation.  
A decision of a district court does not bind the same district court, a 
district court in the same state, or a court of appeals.230 Moreover, a district 
court often does not have the ,nal word on a point of law, especially on 
something as drastic as adopting a new uniform judge-made rule that is a 
likely subject for an appeal. 
B.  Where No Federal Court Has Established  
Federal Common Law 
As noted above, a state court considering whether to create federal 
common law in light of a con+ict between a state rule and a federal scheme 
of rights must do so only where it believes the U.S. Supreme Court would 
create common law.231 In undertaking this task, the state court would have 
to take into account limitations on the Supreme Court’s power, such as the 
RDA.232 Based on the analysis in subsection III.C." regarding the situations 
in which the Supreme Court is likely to ,nd that a federal statute requires 
that something other than state law apply, this Comment proposes the 
following analytical framework for state courts to use. 
First, a state court should determine if the RDA would be implicated in 
the Supreme Court’s federal common law determination. This analysis 
involves a determination about whether the state rule in question is a “rule 
 
228 See supra note !"* and accompanying text. 
229 See, e.g., Mills v. Monroe Cnty., ($! N.E."d ($#, ($% (N.Y. !*&)) (applying a state notice-
of-claim statute in a § !*&! action after disagreeing with the decisions of New York federal district 
courts that the state statute was in con+ict with the policy embodied in the federal statute). 
230 See Yniguez v. Arizona, *)* F."d %"%, %)#-)% (*th Cir. !**!); Caminker, supra note "'), at 
&"$ & n.)! (citing cases for this principle). 
231 See supra note !"* and accompanying text. 
232 See Burbank, supra note !"*, at !$$* n.$!. 
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of decision.” As noted earlier, this phrase essentially asks whether the state 
rule is outcome-determinative.233 
If the RDA is implicated, the state court should look for any speci,c 
intent of Congress with respect to the con+ict between the state rule and 
federal statute in the federal statute’s legislative history.234 If speci,c intent 
from Congress exists as to whether the Court should or should not use the 
state rule, then all that is taking place is statutory interpretation (i.e., 
interpretation of the language of the federal statute).235 If there is speci,c 
congressional intent to interpret a federal statute in a way that cannot 
accommodate the operation of the state rule, then the federal statute surely 
requires that something other than state law apply and the analysis ends.  
If a state court is satis,ed that there is no relevant speci,c intent, it 
should endeavor to ascertain any relevant general intent behind the federal 
statute. The state court can ,nd this general intent in the statute in ques-
tion, the legislative history of the statute in question, or analogous stat-
utes.236 The goal is to determine if the state rule is in con+ict with a “clear 
and substantial” federal policy. 
As we have already seen, the greater the con+ict between the state rule 
and the federal policy, and the more “clear and substantial” the federal 
policy, the more likely it is that the statute should be deemed to require a 
uniform judge-made rule. But if the state rule can coexist with the federal 
policy with minimal disruption or if it actually accomplishes the federal 
policy, then the statute should not be deemed to require a uniform judge-
made rule.237 As noted earlier, this federal policy and con+ict inquiry is only 
half of the required analysis. 
 
233 See supra notes !")-"( and accompanying text. For an example of a state rule that was not 
outcome-determinative, see text accompanying supra note !"". 
234 For example, speci,c intent would exist if Congress had considered including a notice-of-
claim requirement in § !*&) actions but then explicitly rejected such a requirement as inconsistent 
with the goals of § !*&). See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, ((! U.S. (%!, (&) (!*%*) (“Attention must be 
paid as well to what Congress did not do.”); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, ()% U.S. !$), !&!-&" (!*%&) 
(,nding congressional intent in the Endangered Species Act to protect endangered species at great 
cost after Congress had considered and rejected a bill providing for the protection of endangered 
species whenever “practicable”); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, )%) U.S. #(%, #$" (!*#)) (declining to 
create a federal common law cause of action against federal o.cials for abuse of power where 
Congress had considered creating a statutory cause of action and refused to do so). But see Malone 
v. White Motor Corp., ()$ U.S. (*%, $!$-!# (!*%&) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (considering “what 
Congress did not do” to be a mere “inference[]” insu.cient to override Congress’s general intent 
in a statute). 
235 See supra note %* and accompanying text. 
236 See supra notes !((-(% and accompanying text. 
237 See supra note !(* and accompanying text. 
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The state court must also determine whether there are any signs that the 
statute does not require that something other than state law apply. The 
state court should ask the following questions: Does the state rule occupy an 
area of state law that is well developed?238 Does the decision to create a 
uniform judge-made rule touch on delicate federal policy considerations?239 
Have state citizens predicated their commercial relationships on the state 
rule’s application to disputes?240 
Finally, the state court should ask if a con+ict between the federal policy 
and state rule arises in an area of traditional state regulation (i.e., within the 
state’s traditional police power)?241 A subsidiary question that is relevant in 
a reverse-Erie case is whether the state rule is of general (i.e., transsubstan-
tive) or narrow (i.e., substance-speci,c) applicability.242 The state court 
should not, however, use a distinction between procedure and substance as a 
proxy for the strength of federalism concerns.243 
The ultimate goal here is for the state court to come to a reasoned and 
principled conclusion, based on the Supreme Court doctrine, as to when a 
federal statute requires that something other than state law apply. 
C. Evaluating Current State Court Practice Against the  
Proposed Analytical Framework 
Before proceeding to evaluate state court practice against the proposed 
analytical framework, it is important to note that state courts do not 
uniformly treat existing Supreme Court reverse-Erie precedent at a meth-
odological level. State courts seemingly take their cue from the Supreme 
Court’s confusing244 and contradictory245 jurisprudence in the reverse-Erie 
area. 
 
238 See supra note !$) and accompanying text. 
239 See supra notes !$(-$$ and accompanying text. 
240 See supra note !$# and accompanying text. 
241 See supra note !$! and accompanying text. 
242 See supra notes !%'-%# and accompanying text. 
243 See supra notes !&!-&% and accompanying text. 
244 See Samuel P. Jordan, Reverse Abstention, *" B.U. L. REV. !%%!, !%%$ ("'!") (“The Su-
preme Court’s articulation of the contours of [reverse-Erie] analysis has not always been a model 
of clarity . . . .”).  
The Court has, on di-erent occasions, used a substance–procedure distinction, see supra note 
!&!, a discrimination test, see supra notes !%%-%*, an outcome-determination test, see supra notes $*-
#' & #*, and a transsubstantive–substance-speci,c state rule distinction, see supra notes $# & #&. 
The only area where the Court has been consistent in its reverse-Erie cases is in its determination, 
albeit implicitly rather than explicitly, of whether the state rule is in signi,cant con+ict with a 
clear and substantial federal policy. See supra notes !#'-#& and accompanying text; cf. Jordan, 
supra, at !%%$ (“[T]he consistent focus [of reverse-Erie analysis] has been on the substantiality of 
the federal . . . rule at issue.”). 
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The three divergent ways that state courts deal with Supreme Court 
precedent in the reverse-Erie area provide evidence of this lack of uniform 
treatment. Courts either (!) use only certain parts of the analysis from a 
reverse-Erie case;246 (") use only the analysis from the reverse-Erie case that 
is closest in facts to the state court case;247 or ()) use the analysis from the 
most recent Supreme Court reverse-Erie case.248 This lack of uniformity in 
state court treatment of reverse-Erie precedent leads to disparate treatment 
for similarly situated parties in di-erent states—a disturbing outcome. 
Moving beyond state court mistreatment of existing reverse-Erie prece-
dent at a methodological level, many state courts engage in an independent 
balancing of interests test that pits the federal interest in a uniform judge-
made rule against the state’s interest in having its rule apply.249 This inquiry 
is mistaken since the state court’s only duty here, like the duty of a federal 
court in a normal federal common law case, is to determine whether Con-
gress “required” a uniform judge-made rule in its statute.250 
Intimately related to this mistaken analysis is perhaps the most wide-
spread (and demonstrably incorrect251) practice in which state courts 
engage—explicitly (and sometimes implicitly) deciding that “procedural” 
 
245 In its four seminal reverse-Erie cases, the Court has referenced only one scholarly arti-
cle—Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, $( COLUM. L. REV. (&*, 
$'& (!*$()—which discusses state court enforcement of federal rights by noting that “federal law 
takes the state courts as it ,nds them.” In a move typical of the Court’s jurisprudence in the area, 
it expressly rejected Professor Hart’s proposition in Felder v. Casey, (&% U.S. !)!, !$' (!*&&), by 
declaring that it “ha[d] no place under [its] Supremacy Clause analysis,” only to expressly endorse 
the proposition in Johnson v. Fankell, $"' U.S. *!!, *!* (!**%), nine years later. 
246 See, e.g., Blount v. Stroud, &%% N.E."d (*, $*-#) (Ill. App. Ct. "''%) (engaging in an 
extensive Felder analysis of whether a state rule discriminated against a federal right, but not 
engaging in an outcome-determination analysis mandated by the same case), rev’d on other grounds, 
*'( N.E."d ! (Ill. "''*). 
247 See, e.g., Bean v. S.C. Cent. R.R. Co., %'* S.E."d **, !'%-'* (S.C. Ct. App. "'!!) (decid-
ing a reverse-Erie problem about the validity of a FELA release based solely on Dice). 
248 See, e.g., Denari v. Superior Court, "#( Cal. Rptr. "#!, "#$-#& (Ct. App. !*&*) (deciding 
a reverse-Erie problem about a state privilege rule based solely on Felder). 
249 See, e.g., Mills v. Monroe Cnty., ($! N.E."d ($#, ($%-$& (N.Y. !*&)) (,nding that New 
York’s interest in having a notice-of-claim statute for § !*&! actions was “important” and was 
“override[n]” only when a § !*&! suit was brought to “vindicate a public interest”); Axess Int’l, 
Ltd. v. Intercargo Ins. Co, )' P.)d !, %-& (Wash. Ct. App. "''!) (balancing Washington’s interest 
in having a statute that awards attorney’s fees to an insured who must litigate to establish coverage 
against the federal interest in a uniform judge-made rule in an admiralty case); cf. Clermont, supra 
note (, at )) (“[T]he lower courts . . . balance the state’s interests in having its legal rule applied in 
state court on this issue in this case against the federal interests in having federal law displace the 
rule of this particular state . . . .”). 
250 Cf. Free v. Bland, )#* U.S. ##), ### (!*#") (“The relative importance to the State of its 
own law is not material when there is a con+ict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our 
Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail.”). 
251 See supra notes !&!-&% and accompanying text. 
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state law will always govern in a federal action in state court.252 Under the 
state court’s view, the state’s interest in having its procedural laws govern 
categorically outweighs the federal government’s interest in a uniform 
judge-made rule. 
In basing reverse-Erie decisions on characterizing a state rule as either 
procedural or substantive, the state courts can ,nd authority in Supreme 
Court decisions.253 State courts mirror the Supreme Court’s bare assertions 
that a federal rule is “procedural” or “substantive” by citing to their own 
decisions about whether the state rule in question is “substantive” or 
“procedural” and using the state rule if it is “procedural.”254 The error in 
this analysis is the same error that the Supreme Court makes when it 
conducts the procedural–substantive analysis. Procedural state laws can be 
in deep con+ict with “clear and substantial” federal policy just as much as 
substantive state laws can. The labels of procedure and substance are 
capable of manipulation and have no bearing on the state court’s task. 
The better analysis asks if the state rule is transsubstantive or substance-
speci,c. These labels are a better proxy for Congress’s intent of creating a 
uniform judge-made rule because they are not subject to manipulation like 
the terms “procedure” and “substance.” Moreover, the state will always have 
a strong interest in having its transsubstantive rules followed in its courts, 
and thus it is less likely that a federal statute requires something other than 
the transsubstantive rule to be applied. 
 
252 See, e.g., Williams v. Horvath, $(& P."d !!"$, !!)' (Cal. !*%#) (“[T]he ,ling of a claim for 
damages is more than a procedural requirement, it is a condition precedent to plainti-’s maintain-
ing an action against defendants, in short, an integral part of plainti-’s cause of action.” (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted)); Dunn v. St. Louis–S.F. Ry. Co., #"! S.W."d "($, "$( 
(Mo. !*&!) (en banc) (“[T]he form of instructions and manner in which the substantive law is 
submitted to the jury in an F.E.L.A. case are procedural matters governed by state law.”); Roberts 
v. CSX Transp., Inc., #&& S.E."d !%&, !&( (Va. "'!') (“Nor will applying the Virginia rule a-ect 
the ‘rights and obligations of the parties’ under the procedural/substantive rubric.” (citation and 
internal quotations omitted)). 
253 See supra notes !&!-&" and accompanying text. Unfortunately, in the reverse-Erie context, 
the Supreme Court has not been explicit in cautioning courts about using labels like “procedure” 
or “substance” as it has in the Erie context. See supra note !&% and accompanying text. 
254 See, e.g., Ind. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Clark, (%& N.E."d #**, %'" (Ind. Ct. App. !*&$) 
(“[The state rule] is a procedural precedent which must be ful,lled before ,ling suit in a state 
court. Because it is a procedural precondition to sue, it overrides the procedural framework 
of § !*&) when the litigant chooses a state court forum.” (citation omitted)), overruled by Felder v. 
Casey, (&% U.S. !)! (!*&&). The Clark court cited an Indiana Supreme Court case, Thompson v. City 
of Aurora, )"$ N.E."d &)* (Ind. !*%$), for the proposition that the state rule was “procedural.” Id. 
Thompson was a case that deemed the state rule procedural as a matter of state law. )"$ N.E."d at 
&(". The characterization of the state rule as procedural for state law purposes obviously has no 
application to whether the state rule is procedural when it comes to its clash with a federal law. 
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Some state courts twist this analysis in a way that leads to the use of a 
state rule. Most commonly, the state court will misinterpret the Supreme 
Court’s general–speci,c state rule distinction. Instead of asking whether the 
state rule is substance-speci,c or transsubstantive, the state court asks 
whether a substance-speci,c state rule discriminates against the federal 
right.255 Again, state courts can ,nd authority in Supreme Court decisions 
when engaging in this discrimination inquiry.256 
However, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court should give weight only 
to transsubstantive state rules “regarding the administration of the state 
courts.”257 A federal statute is less likely to require a uniform judge-made 
rule where a transsubstantive state rule is being used because an underlying 
part of the state judicial system is being displaced.258 Simply because a 
substance-speci,c state rule does not discriminate against a federal right 
does not mean that a federal statute is more or less likely to require a 
uniform judge-made rule.  
Other state courts distinguish the facts of the case they are considering 
from the Supreme Court’s reverse-Erie cases and, having done so, ,nd that 
there is nothing barring the court from using state law.259 These courts are 
ostensibly looking for a Supreme Court case that deals precisely with the 
facts presented to them before they will disregard the state rule. This 
approach abdicates the state courts’ obligation to determine whether the 
Supreme Court would ,nd that a federal statute requires a uniform judge-
made rule. Simply because such a federal common law rule does not yet 
exist, does not mean the Supreme Court, if presented with the case, would 
not ,nd that a federal statute requires one. 
Some state courts adopt the position that they will always defer to what-
ever federal policy comes into con+ict with the state rule under the principle 
 
255 See, e.g., Roccaforte v. Je-erson Cnty., "&! S.W.)d ")', ")$ (Tex. App. "''*) (citing 
Johnson as a basis for using a state notice-of-claim statute because the state statute “uniformly 
applies to all plainti-s in suits against a county and its o.cials”), rev’d on other grounds, )(! S.W.)d 
*!* (Tex. "'!!). A state notice-of-claim statute that applies only in suits against a county and its 
o.cials is a substance-speci,c state rule, not a transsubstantive rule. 
256 See supra notes !%&-%* and accompanying text.  
257 Johnson v. Fankell, $"' U.S. *!!, *!& (!**%).  
258 See supra notes !%!-%) and accompanying text; cf. Johnson, $"' U.S. at *!& (“[O]ur normal 
presumption against pre-emption is buttressed by the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court’s 
dismissal of the appeal rested squarely on a neutral state Rule regarding the administration of the state 
courts.” (emphasis added)). 
259 See, e.g., Bean v. S.C. Cent. R.R. Co., %'* S.E."d **, !'%-'* (S.C. Ct. App. "'!!) (dis-
tinguishing Dice and holding, without further reverse-Erie analysis, that a challenge to a FELA 
release does not preclude summary judgment). 
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of comity.260 Because these state courts do so as a matter of state common 
law, their practice is not incorrect. However, this Comment lays out a 
framework for state court judges that clari,es the analysis and should make 
it unnecessary to always defer to federal law.  
While comity plays a role in the weight a state court should give to deci-
sions of lower federal courts,261 it does not protect states’ rights as well as a 
true federal common law creation analysis does. The better analysis is to 
undertake a searching inquiry as to whether the federal statute “requires” 
that something other than state law apply, rather than assume that a federal 
statute requires a uniform judge-made rule whenever it con+icts in a minor 
way with a state rule. 
Finally, some state courts utilize an outcome-determination test that 
asks whether following the state rule would lead to a di-erent outcome than 
if the case in question was ,led in federal court.262 Again, in basing reverse-
Erie decisions on this outcome-determination principle, the state courts can 
,nd authority in decisions of the Supreme Court.263 As explained earlier in 
this Comment, whether a state rule is outcome-determinative sheds little 
light on whether the federal statute requires that something other than state 
law apply. 
However, despite many misguided approaches to reverse-Erie problems, 
some state courts do engage in some parts of the proposed analytical 
framework laid out in this Comment. Some courts try to determine the 
general intent of Congress to ascertain the clarity and substantiality of the 
 
260 See, e.g., Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. Price, $)* So. "d "'", "'$-'# (Ala. !*&&) (“Judicial 
comity causes us, as a state court, to defer to federal law . . . .”). In Price, the plainti- brought a 
FELA action, and a state rule provided a mechanism for state court defendants to move to dismiss 
an action upon the death of the plainti- if a motion for substitution was not made within six 
months of the death. Id. at "'). The defendant moved to dismiss on that basis, and the plainti- 
objected, citing FELA’s provision that “[a]ny right of action given by this chapter to a person 
su-ering injury shall survive to his or her personal representative.” Id. at "'$. On its face, the 
FELA death provision did not foreclose a state from imposing limiting rules related to substitu-
tion. However, rather than engaging in any analysis regarding a potential con+ict between the 
federal policy behind the FELA death provision and the state rule, the state court declined to 
follow the state rule. In doing so, the state court noted that “[u]nder the concepts of civility and 
courtesy (which we reach before we reach the concept that an Alabama law that interferes with a 
federal law must yield), we defer to federal law, whether it be substantive or procedural, in 
enforcing a federal cause of action . . . .” Id. at "'#. 
261 See supra note ""' and accompanying text. 
262 See New Dimensions, Inc. v. Tarquini, %() S.E."d "#%, "%! (Va. "'!)) (“[W]e hold that 
application of Virginia pleading standards to the EPA a.rmative defenses would not lead to a 
substantial di-erence in outcomes of state and federal EPA actions. Therefore, we will apply 
Virginia procedural law concerning the pleading of a.rmative defenses in EPA actions brought in 
Virginia courts.”). 
263 See supra notes !*'-*!. 
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federal policy that is in con+ict with a state rule.264 Additionally, other 
courts correctly follow Supreme Court precedent, giving more weight in the 
federal common law creation analysis to transsubstantive state rules.265 
CONCLUSION 
The most critical departure this Comment has made from reverse-Erie 
scholarship is to proceed on the basis that reverse-Erie is just a decision 
about whether to create federal common law. Most of the analytical confu-
sion about reverse-Erie—namely, that reverse-Erie cases can be analyzed 
using Erie doctrines like outcome-determination and the procedure–
substance dichotomy—is a product of failing to understand that concept. In 
addition, this Comment regards the Rules of Decision Act as controlling the 
creation of federal common law and doing so in both federal and state court. 
Based on these concepts, this Comment has presented one possible ap-
proach to treating reverse-Erie problems—a Rules of Decision Act ap-
proach. Such an approach would facilitate a uniform theory of reverse-Erie 
that would clear up the current confusion in the doctrine at the Supreme 
Court level (and, thus, also at the state court level).  
However, because there are other theories of federal common law mak-
ing than those that +ow from a Rules of Decision Act approach, there are 
alternate theories of reverse-Erie. The next step is for scholars that sub-
scribe to other theories of federal common law making to evaluate reverse-
Erie under those theories as this Comment has done with the Rules of 
Decision Act. 
 
 
264 See, e.g., Williams v. Horvath, $(& P."d !!"$, !!"*-)' (Cal. !*%#) (identifying the strong 
remedial policy of Congress behind § !*&) and declining to apply a state notice-of-claim statute 
that con+icted with this policy); Axess Int’l, Ltd. v. Intercargo Ins. Co, )' P.)d !, & (Wash. Ct. 
App. "''!) (following a state rule about reimbursement of attorney’s fees in insurance litigation 
where the court found that the federal policy behind a uniform rule was not clear). 
265 See, e.g., Roberts v. CSX Transp., Inc., #&& S.E."d !%&, !&( (Va. "'!') (applying a state 
rule mandating that certain jurors be excused for cause by the court rather than through a 
peremptory strike because the rule applied to all jury trials in any action in the state courts). 
